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Abstract
This thesis submission interrogates the concept of mythology within the opposing
philosophical frameworks of the world as either an abstract totality from which ‘truth’
is derived, or as a chaotic background to which the subject brings a synthetic unity.
Chapter One compares the culturally dominant, classical philosophical picture of the
world as a necessary, knowable totality, with the more recent conception of the ‘world’
as a series of ideational repetitions (sense) grafted on to material flows emanating
from a chaotic background (non-sense). Drawing on Plato, Kant, and Heidegger, I
situate mythology as a conception of the false—that which fails to correlate with the
‘world’ as a necessary whole. Working with Deleuze, I reconsider the conception of
mythology from the perspective of absolute contingency—mythology as a set of
reductive rules or principles which, rather than apprehending the world in its
hiddenness, instead constitute the world as a series of repetitive, but ultimately
ideational subjective objects grafted on to a background chaos.
Chapter Two examines mythology within the perspective of what Deleuze refers to as
the aleatory moment (the conditions of chance contained within every sensuous ontic
encounter). Here I introduce the concept of the aleatory circle—an ontically necessary
foreclosure of the conditions of possibility (the multiplicity) contained in every
sensuous encounter (or ‘event’). I compare the rules of the game with the ontically
necessary opening of the conditions of possibility (the aleatory moment or point of
chance) and its necessary foreclosure as dictated by the rules of time and space. Here I
introduce the concept of the mythological apparatus—a framework of ideational rules
derived from the repetitions of the aleatory circle encountered by the subject in its
sensuous mode. The myth apparatus is, in my view, both constitutive of, and
constituted by, the ‘world’, governing the position of the subject within a framework
established by ontic repetition.
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Preface
The conception of mythology that drives current understanding relies on a
supposition of ‘truth’ derived from the concept of the world as a necessary totality,
from which emerges the possibility of an understanding of the real as a grounded,
knowable object. Myth, as conventionally conceived, is the position of the
abstraction—of the fantastical or false. Epistemological schemes that demand a
correlative methodology conceive of the ‘world’ as a ground from which knowledge, in
its expressive mode, may be attained. The truth of the world is therefore singular—a
homogeneous space that dictates the structural frame by which the subject
apprehends its necessities. As we will see, however, the history of the structural
apparatus is also the history of the mythological ground—a metaphysical
presupposition reliant on a conception of the ‘material’ of the world as a ground from
which true knowledge emanates. It is through the ‘reality’ of the material that a
cohesive, totalized and knowable picture of the world is meant to emerge. In this
regard, mythological thought may be conceived in two ways: 1) as metaphor,
describing a cohesion of phenomena that intervenes ahead of natural inquiry,
presenting the world as an abstract totality through logical synthesis of ‘determinate’
objects, and 2) as lateral, or fantastical speculation regarding the origin of the ground
of phenomena.
The logic of the mythological apparatus parallels what we will refer to as the natural
image of thought—a classical conception of knowledge that presupposes the positions
of truth and falsity within a world comprised of knowable, grounded empirical
phenomena emanating from a necessary world. The mythological apparatus’
character remains sutured to a presupposition of the world as a totality, intervening in
a constitutive mode ahead of any subjective interpretation of ontic ‘events.’
Chapter One of this work discusses the concept of world, examining two opposing
views: 1) the world as a grounded, knowable totality expressing its necessities, and 2)
the world as a background chaos, or ‘non-sense’, to which the subject applies rules or
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judgment. Chapter Two re-views what we refer to as the ‘mythological apparatus’—a
set of ontic rules ‘determined’ by the false repetition of the same. Here we examine the
role of chance within an ontic conception, and consider the possibility for subjective
world-building operating within a background of non-sense.

Chapter One: The World Picture with Respect to
Ontological Demarcation
1.1 An Image of the World
It seems that whatever we designate as the world must be accessible and adequately
describable under proper conditions and with a thorough methodology, and yet the
history of Western philosophy marks the abject failure of this endeavor. Science, as
the preferred epistemic mode of the late modern period, solidifies the possibility for
an ‘ontic’ understanding of the world under given conditions, but retains as its first
postulate the impossibility of knowing the world as an ontological precept and as a
coherent, self-enclosed whole. Scientism, the belief in the methodology of science, is
the religion for an age that has largely abandoned the possibility of an ontological
understanding of the world as a concrete object of knowledge. As such, we pursue
adequate ontic descriptions,1 favoring a system of cataloguing the modalities of the
natural world. Magnitude marks the master dialectic of the natural view, a view in
which empirical phenomena are elevated to the order of world-constructing ahead of
any notions of a totalized unity. In its difference, the world of becoming instantiates
an absent totality: the world is comprised of brute fact—a collection or series of realexistent, yet banal, positive empirical phenomena that, when taken as a ‘whole’,
represents the fellowship of the human “subjective” experience with its ‘objective’
material conditions. The natural view is cautious in its approach, consistently refining

1

I understand ontic as that which is ‘real’ and ‘factual,’ as opposed to ontological—the possibility of the
‘Being of beings” (see Chapter Two, p.21 footnote for a description of Heidegger’s definitions and my
usage)
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its various frameworks and methodologies.2 The world, as such, inhabits a place of a
fractured totality. It is a subjectively unconstituted field, broken into bits made
digestible to human cognition. Despite its various contractions and expansions, the
natural sciences have a tendency toward a notion of truth that predicates the world as
a concrete totality. There is a teleological bent to the cultural mode of scientific
inquiry. Despite its various changes, ‘revolutions,’ and retractions, real objective
knowledge seems to always lie just beyond the horizon. This type of frontierism avoids
an inconvenient space of confrontation: when every horizon has been crossed, and
when all the forces which govern our existence have been confronted and catalogued,
have we really learned anything meaningful about the world as it exists in itself? If I
master the game of chess, have I come to understand the meaning of chess in its
entirety?
We take another view: the world as it is in itself is a background chaos, a nonground from which emanates only a false veneer of a concrete totality. The world, in
this sense, is fractured at its very beginning. Knowledge is not a great crusade—the
opening of the world and the conquering of its secrets. It is more of a game—the
traversing of chaos with a touch of aesthetic flair.3 Plato famously inaugurated a
concept of the world founded on a model / copy distinction. The question of Being
saturates Plato’s Sophist.4 The Eleatic Visitor proposes a number of divisions in which
he attempts to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher. First among them is the
sophist’s imitative quality. This movement relies on an explicit origin of self-same
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Gilles Deleuze refers to the dogmatic image of thought specific to the modern era as follows: “all we
need to think well, and to think truthfully, is a method. Method is an artifice but one through which we
are brought back to the artifice of thought, through which we adhere to this nature and ward off the
effect of the alien forces which alter it and distract us. Through method we ward off error. Time and
place matter little if we apply method: it enables us to enter the domain of “that which is valid for all
times and places.” See Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983), 103.
3
Here I reference Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “From Chaos to the Brain”, in What is Philosophy?,
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 201-218.
4
Here I tie the notion of Being to that of the world as it exists in itself, as a necessary totality from which
‘models’ emerge in representation. Plato, as conventionally received, founds his philosophy on the
expressive nature of the world with respect to Ideas.
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Being accessible to the dialectician, and made explicit through language.5 The sophist,
in his imitation, drains the dialectic of any essential Being in favor of the movement of
images lacking an essential (worldly) ground—which the Visitor refers to as “likeness
making.”6 The sophist, according to the Visitor, elides truth in favor of a production
of images with no relation to Being as such. The Visitor’s division of language into the
philosopher’s speech, with its attendant presence, and the sophist’s, which does not,
ignores a fundamental tension in ontological inquiry: language penetrates ‘knowledge’
of the world, but knowledge cannot deduce Being as a substantial property. It is only,
according to the Socratic method, through dialogue that Being is made to appear. The
model from which the sophist derives his copy is hidden. In Phaedrus, Lysias’ oratory
adopts two distinct metaphysical tones: one of the authentic, of the true with respect
to Being, and the other as mere sophistry—the form without the content. The former
conception is reminiscent of the modern dominant cultural view: the world is a place
of conquest, a knowable but presently hidden, necessary and complete entity within
which ‘true’ models may be distinguished from ‘false’ copies.7 As Deleuze
characterizes it:
The function of the notion of the model is not to oppose the world of
images in its entirety but to select the good images, the icons which
resemble from within, and eliminate the bad images or simulacra.
Platonism as a whole is erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down
the phantasms or simulacra which are identified with the Sophist
himself, that devil, that insinuator or simulator, that always disguised
and displaced false pretender. For this reason it seems to us that, with
Plato, a philosophical decision of the utmost importance was taken:

5

This mirrors the concept of reification. The world is brought in to being through language. Being, in
this sense, is a background which ontic existence covers over. It is the job of the dialectician to establish
authentic Being not in language, but through the confrontation of difference.
6
Plato. “Sophist”, in Plato Complete Works, 235-293, ed. John M. Cooper, and D. S. Hutchinson, trans.
Nicholas P. White (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 256.
7
See Plato, “Phaedrus”, in Plato Complete Works, 506-556, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson,
trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).
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that of subordinating difference to the supposedly initial powers of the
Same and the Similar, that of declaring difference unthinkable in itself
and sending it, along with the simulacra, back to the bottomless ocean.8
Deliverance from the fractured world has taken myriad forms, but the structure of
belief that has historically served to move humanity toward ‘transcendence’ has
remained largely the same. There is a fundamental motion within the human spirit,
one endeavoring to ascend to a forgotten unity of the world together with its
impoverished corporeal subjects. We observe this in many myths and legends. It is the
story of the Book of Genesis, and of the fall of man. It is the story of lost unity, of the
fracture of the world and the loss of togetherness with God.9 The story of the original,
of the model, is the story of the unity of the subject with the ‘world’ (allegorized as
God). The father is the original ground that delivers man in to the world, providing
structure and guiding the subject away from the dangers of the simulacra. The
sovereign position of God, the father, mirrors that of the sovereign position of Being,
the creator. This original unity has guided Western thought and remains within
aspects of the scientific worldview. Derrida characterizes it as follows: “the name of
man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of
ontotheology—in other words, throughout his history—has dreamed of full presence,
the reassuring foundation.”10

8

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), 127.
9
In philosophical terms we refer to togetherness as the adequation of the subject with Being as it exists in
itself. Being should be understood as an ontological property—a bringing together of the subject with the
world in an ontologically complete manner. This view is often considered ‘religious’ or mystical, but as
we shall discuss in Chapter Two, the origins of the myth of Being share a common ground with the
myth structure of human cognition and relies on the same supposition of the world as a necessary,
concrete totality from which ‘man has fallen.’ As opposed to this view, the world conceived as a chaotic
field, or background noise to which the subject brings a fictitious, ‘mythological’ unity, offers a unique
understanding of the role of myth and what we will refer to as the mythological apparatus in Chapter
Two, with respect to the ontic/ontological genesis of mythologies.
10
Jacques Derrida, “Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 290.
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Despite traces of the (classical) Platonic view remaining in Western metaphysics,
the question of totality, it seems, has largely been abandoned.11 An emphasis on
observable, measurable phenomena has separated ‘knowledge’ of the world from an
understanding of the world as an authentic, knowable totality. As such, allegorical
myths and legends which have historically provided a defining character of the world
have been given secondary status—they lack empirical determination; they are based
in fantasy; they have a ‘scientific’ explanation, etc. The conquest of the world has
adopted a different tone. We no longer seek the definition of the world through
mythico-historical means, but rather as a collection of brute facts that comprise a great
machine of unknown character and origin. As Adorno and Horkheimer note of the
enlightenment:
Mimetic, mythical, and metaphysical forms of behavior were
successively regarded as stages of world history which had been left
behind, and the idea of reverting to them held the terror that the self
would be changed back into the mere nature from which it had
extricated itself with unspeakable exertions and which for that reason
filled it with unspeakable dread.12
In its cultural presentation, the ontological world-picture of the scientific age is one of
confusion. We have, on the one hand, the tools necessary for a rigorous but
incomplete picture of a world comprised of empirical phenomena and the rules

11

Deleuze emphasizes the ‘non-Platonic’ tone in Plato’s later works, arguing that Plato himself
understood the fissures in the model/copy distinction. Deleuze writes “The Sophist himself is the being
of the simulacrum, the satyr or centaur, the Proteus who meddles and insinuates himself everywhere.
For this reason, it may be that the end of the Sophist contains the most extraordinary adventure of
Platonism: as a consequence of searching in the direction of the simulacrum and leaning over its abyss,
Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it
places in question the very notations of copy and model.” It is possible that Plato succumbed to the
dialectic and ultimately delivered Western thought over to the primacy of the simulacra. See Deleuze,
“Appendix 1. The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy,” in The Logic of Sense, 253-279, ed. Mark
Lester, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 256.
12
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New
York: Continuum, 1989), 24.
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governing them. On the other hand the concept of world has become impoverished—
conceived as a hangover from more dogmatic, uncritical times. The demarcation of
what constitutes proper knowledge of the world and what is possible to know has been
made explicit by countless philosophers and scientists. We grasp the limitations of
human understanding, and along with the conquest of the worldly frontier, focus our
efforts in other areas. We understand the world in a reduced manner and fail to grasp
it as an object of relevant inquiry in its own right. This is not to say that myths and
legends are the safeguard of secret knowledge, containing the keys to a forgotten
understanding of the world. It is only to comment on the shift in academic tone
permeating the academy and mass culture. Alongside the notion of a totalized,
knowable and necessary world, allegories which have historically given rise to the
definition of the world are entirely suspect. We should consider religious myths as
categorically similar to the notion of the original model or self-same property and,
accordingly, afford them the same critical treatment.
Commentators of Kant and his successors have lauded his critical project as one of
delivering philosophy over to ‘science’ in its sharpening of the lines which separate
“truth” from illusion.13 The whole of philosophy, on this view, adopts a scientific
quality in its determination of the difference between knowledge of the world and
pseudo-scientific empirical extrapolation. Whatever phenomena may be, it is argued,
a definitive line must be drawn between what constitutes the world as a real, semicausal, translatable apparatus, and the supplemental subjective ideations the flawed
human-animal brings to bear upon that world. Kant’s critical project re-situated the
locus of world to within the ‘universal’ structures of human cognition, inaugurating a

13

Here I consider the preface to The First Critique, wherein Kant is explicit in his aim of the discovery of
universal structures of human cognition. One of Kant’s strongest contribution, in my view, is the
distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ deductions, which allowed Kant, notably, in The Third
Critique, to distinguish between aesthetic (synthetic) and natural (analytic) judgments. See Chapter
Two, pp.30-31 for a brief introduction to The Third Critique and Kant’s Aesthetic Idea. Truth, in this
reduced sense, is the name given to the proper representation, or correlation of the subject with the
object, which Kant sought to demarcate from fantasies of the Ideal.
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critique of the metaphysics of Being and of the Cartesian I. As Adorno and
Horkheimer note:
Kant combined the doctrine of thought’s restlessly toilsome progress
toward infinity with insistence on its insufficiency and eternal
limitation. The wisdom he imparted is oracular: There is no being in
the world that knowledge cannot penetrate, but what can be penetrated
by knowledge is not being.14
In Kant the picture of the world is radically transformed. Being no longer enjoys a
privileged status within the context of universally valid structures of thought. We refer
to Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ as the re-situating of the world to within the subject,
absent the cohesion of the Cartesian I. The world is a site of transcendental illusion
and error, with only the subject bringing unity to chaos. As Adorno and Horkheimer
note: “the transcendental subject of knowledge, as the last reminder of subjectivity, is
itself seemingly abolished and replaced by the operations of the automatic
mechanisms of order, which therefore run all the more smoothly.”15
Natural science enjoys the privileged position of a metaphysics which presents as a
non-metaphysics: a collection of methodologies under which the truth conditions of
the world may be adequately fulfilled (in time) because they have been reduced to the
point of the elimination of a large section of human subjective experience, and, as I
will argue, of the conditions which give rise to the picture of the world itself. For
Heidegger “metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of
what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis
upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the
phenomena that distinguish the age.”16 On the assumptions made within the scientific

14

(Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 19)
Ibid., 23.
16
Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1977), 115.
15
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worldview, the precepts of its metaphysics intervenes as a framework ahead of any
individual interpretation of the world. The scientific world-picture marks the
systematic erasure of the indeterminate. Incomplete phenomena like dreams, myths,
legends, etc. are relegated to the position of fantasy—a grouping of often spectacular
but ultimately meaningless distractions from any ‘authentic’ understanding of the
world. Here, criticism of the interpretation of ‘immaterial’ phenomena adopts the
position of a warning against the dangers of a naïve idealism—of equating chaotic
phenomenal touchstones as ontologically similar in kind to representations of
empirical substance. As such, the scientific world-picture often engenders a type of
hostility to that which seemingly lacks empirical determination.
The inclusion of ‘mythological’ interpretations as a relevant area of inquiry follows
a conception of world based on the traditional model / copy formulation. If the world
is, as classically conceived, a discrete totality capable of expressing its ‘essential’
properties, then mythological thought falls into the category of the false. If, on the
other hand, what we consider as the world marks an ideal synthesis—a synthetic
construction blending empirical experience with transcendental interpretation—then
mythological thought adopts a different tone. It is, in this way, elevated to an
ontological status similar to phenomena ‘perceived’ in representation.17
Markus Gabriel notes, “anything we encounter in the world and to which we are
capable of referring by some singular term, i.e. anything to which we concede
existence, is part of a certain domain.”18 The relevant domains we concede to the
natural sciences are those that present possible empirical determination. As a cultural
motif, scientism suffers the unfortunate distinction of believing in science as a type of
messianic productive apparatus—a type of world-constructing mechanism that brings

17

I refer here to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of psychoanalysis and its relation to myth. See Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Men,” 139-272, in Anti-Oedipus, trans.
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
18
Markus Gabriel, Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism (London:
Continuum International Publishing, 2009), 15.
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‘objective’ fact into the subjective view. Scientism tends to neglect ‘non-sense’—that
which fails to cohere with an ontic frame that is itself established through fine-tuning
of the metaphysical scientific apparatus.19 The importance of phenomena that fall
outside its stated domain of interrogation tend to be pathologized or mythologized in
such a way as to drain them of any ‘real’ meaning. These myths amount to
transcendental illusion or biological malfunction and, as such, are relegated to a
particular domain of knowledge that carries secondary status to the ‘hard sciences.’
The scientific world-picture appears to be inadequate to the task of forming a
conception of world as a concrete totality. If we consider Gabriel’s definition of the
world as a set of domains, then it follows that the domain of all domains—the world—
should emerge as an area of inquiry into which human cognition may make some
progress. Speculative ontological systems have offered brilliant images of the world,
but have failed to ground their systems adequately to the world as a totality. Through
the various movements of philosophies of fundamental ontology, through
epistemology, and finally through philosophies of difference, Western thought has
attempted to situate the world conceptually by defining the play of phenomena
against a speculative background of a given type. The teleological negative of Hegel,
Deleuze’s transcendental-empiricism, Plato’s One, are different names for the World
as an incomplete conceptual field from or within which productive phenomena
proceed. Despite the variations found within the tradition. and with few exceptions,
the World remains a complex, presently unknowable entity within which human
cognition has emerged. As Gabriel characterizes it: “Despite the turbulent rapture we

19

The question of sense is best penetrated by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense, specifically in his discussion
on the work of Lewis Carroll (Alice both “grows” and “shrinks” at once.). Writes Deleuze: “A false
proposition remains no less a proposition endowed with sense. Non-sense would then be the
characteristic of that which can be neither true nor false. Two dimensions may be distinguished in a
proposition: expression, in which a proposition says or expresses some idea; and designation, in which
it indicates or designates the objects to which what is said or expressed applies.” (Gilles Deleuze, The
Logic of Sense, ed. Mark Lester, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press,
1990), 153.
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experience in our personal life and despite the utter contingency of the roles we play,
there ultimately is a background in front of which we enact our lives.”20
We have, in various times, witnessed attempts to ground phenomena within a
concrete totality, providing definition for the character of the world as it exists in
itself. Attempts to situate the world in an ontologically and epistemologically
sufficient manner have constantly returned philosophy to its perennial questions.
That which is supposed to ground experience or intuition in Being (as world), whether
the ‘material,’ time, or otherwise, eludes the prospect of a complete determination. It
seems that under the weight of becoming, Being is radically effaced. As Nietzsche put
it, “the idea that everything becomes show us the vanity of Being.”21 The capture and
cataloguing of the various modes of becoming mark the domain, or domains, of
relevant inquiry pursued in the natural sciences. These are quantitative or qualitative
advancements of a representative apparatus whose correlate is supposed as ‘the world’.
Objects of relevant inquiry, whether in physics, biology, the social sciences, etc. take as
their point of departure a grounding frame established first as a metaphysical
structure (i.e.: empiricism). The world as a concept fades to the background as the
frame which provides the natural sciences its justification in ‘world-building’ is
reinforced. ‘The vanity of Being’, as Nietzsche put it, is the pretension of any inquiry
into the world, whether philosophical or otherwise, that it may come to know Being as
such. As Schelling argued: “Every organic individual exists, as something that has
become, only through another, and in this respect is dependent according to its
becoming but by no means according to its Being.”22 In this sense the natural sciences,
whose ground is the cataloguing and proper re-presentation of the modalities of
becoming, lacks privileged access to Being or the world as such.

20

(Gabriel, 28)
Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in Gilles Deleuze, What is Grounding?, transcript by Pierre Lefebvre,
trans. Arjen Kleinherenbrink, ed. Tony Yanick, Jason Adams, and Mohammad Salemy (Grand Rapids:
&&& Publishing, 2015), 81.
22
F.W.J Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and
Johannes Schmidt (New York: SUNY, 2006), 17.
21
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The natural sciences aim at the forces underwriting phenomena with respect to
governing laws. As Schelling notes:
The direction of all natural activity will aim toward mean products,
toward materials which are absolutely compostable and absolutely
decomposable at once, and permanent processes will appear in Nature
(as object), through which the incompostable is constantly
decomposed, and the indecomposable constantly composed.23
Understood philosophically, laws of nature represent the determination of the
fluctuations of the natural world picture—no final product, only the force that
underwrites phenomena as such. In Schelling’s work on the philosophy of nature
(naturphilosophie) he emphasizes the possibility of driving forces determining
quantitative modalities expressed by nature. It is not an ontological but an ontic chaos
which determines the constant state of becoming observed in the natural world.
Since each actant is highly individual, and since each strives to produce
what it must produce according to its nature, this will furnish the dram
of the struggle in which not force entirely conquers the other nor
completely submits to the other. The egotism of each individual actant
must join itself to that of the others; what is produced is a product of
the subordination of all under one and one under all, i.e.: the most
complete mutual subordination. No individual potency could produce
the whole or itself, but all together can produce it. The product does
not lie in the individual, but in the all together, for it is indeed itself
nothing other than the external phenomenon or the visible expression

23

F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson (New
York: SUNY Press, 2003), 32. (My emphasis)
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of that constantly operating combination and decomposition of
elements.24
The characterizing and cataloguing of infinite flows of seemingly fixed laws does not
represent an adequate picture of the world, as Schelling notes. The totality of the
world consists not only in the movement of phenomena and the rules that underwrite
their actions, but also the domain within which these flows occur. In Schelling’s
naturphilosophie, the governing structure of becoming is not the qualitative or
qualitative modalities of overlapping, mutual or contradictory expressions, but is
instead the necessity of an a priori natural apparatus from which necessary causes that
give rise to the effects as experienced in human cognition. Schelling aims at the forces
which ‘drive’ the compulsions discovered in nature. He notes: “This drive will not be
free in its direction; its direction is determined for it by the universal hierarchy; there
is, as it were, a sphere circumscribed for it in advance, beyond whose limits it can
never step and into which it constantly returns.”25
The sphere circumscribed in advance are the rules of the ontic game, and represents
the ‘structure’ from which natural fluctuations ‘become.’ We understand games as
philosophical construction. A game is a structured totality within which mathematical
or interpretive ‘moves’ operate in free play. In a sense, the rules of the game operate as
an a priori governing structure not unlike the ‘rules’ of the natural world. The rules for
the game of chess, for example, fabricate a ‘structure’ within, or through which a set of
ontic possibilities are created. These possibilities are not ‘real’ in the way we classically
understand the term. They are grounded only by the conditions of possibility created
by the structure of the rule set. The set of rules governing the movement of chess
pieces is a fabrication. Though the game, with its inexplicably large number of moves,
counter-moves, strategies, and possibilities, plays out in the ‘real world,’ we
understand that in the absence of the rule-set, nothing of consequence would have
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occurred. In much the same way, the ontic rules which govern the various processes of
becoming expressed in the natural world mirrors the logical structure of the
preconditions of the game. As such, were we to establish the first causes, or necessary
structure, of the ontic game, it still would not constitute an adequate picture of the
world as it exists in its totality. Whatever forces drive the conditions of free play found
within the game of chess, and despite the presupposition of a structured totality with
respect to governing rules, it is apparent that whatever lies beyond the game of chess is
an inaccessible domain unexplainable absent the rules of the game itself. Natural
science is pursuit of the mastery of the ontic game. It cannot consider the domain
within which the authentic meaning of the world comes in to view, much in the same
way theology and philosophy, in their speculative modes, fall short of the task.26
Deleuze characterizes human games as follows:
First, human games presuppose pre-existing categorical rules. Second,
these rules serve to determine the probabilities – in other words, the
winning and losing ‘hypotheses’. Third, these games never affirm the
whole of chance: on the contrary, they fragment it and, for each case,
subtract or remove the consequences of the throw from chance, since
they assign this or that loss or gain as though it were necessarily tied to
a given hypothesis.27
A rule set given by positivist science always complies with a governing principle—a
frame of postulates that defines a specific mode of inquiry. Absent metaphysical
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presuppositions, or what we have referred to as the rules of the game, the world
descends into ‘non-sense’, with only a corporeally grounded fixed point of reference
persisting in time and space. Deleuze notes:
Nothing is more fragile than the surface. Is not this secondary
organization threatened by a monster even more awesome than the
Jabberwocky—by a formless, fathomless nonsense, very different from
what we previously encountered in the two figures still inherent to
sense? At first, the threat is imperceptible, but a few steps suffice to
make us aware of an enlarged crevice; the whole organization of the
surface has already disappeared, overturned in a terrible primordial
order. Nonsense no longer gives sense, for it has consumed everything.
We might have thought at first that we were inside the same element,
or in a neighboring element. But we see now that we have changed
elements, that we have entered the storm.28
Deleuze splits corporeal actions, modes, and sensations (causes) from incorporeal
effects. Sense proceeds over the surface, providing unity to the world. In its absence,
the world fragments. There can no longer be a distinction between true and false, only
the movement of pure becoming instantiated by the corporeal. As Deleuze writes:
In this collapse of the surface, the entire world loses its meaning. It
maintains perhaps a certain power of denotation, but this is
experienced as empty. It maintains a certain power of manifestation,
but this is experienced as indifferent. And it maintains a certain
signification, experienced as “false.” Nevertheless, the word loses its
sense, that is, its power to draw together or to express an incorporeal
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effect distinct from the actions and passions of the body, and an
ideational event distinct from its present realization.29
With respect to the fragmentation of the world absent a given ruleset, two cultural
views have emerged: systems of thought which cohere with ‘reality’—the underwriting
laws which govern the rules of the game, and frameworks of “mythology”—
speculative constructions meant to provide definition of the world as such. What
motivates my work in Chapter One is to provide definition to the world as a domain
of relevant inquiry. In Chapter Two I chart the conditions of possibility for the creation
of what I refer to as the mythological apparatus—a type of ontic / ontological worldbuilding frame grounded in the multiplicity contained in every sensuous encounter
with the world. In my view, the concept of the world as a necessary, totalized object
from which emanates expressive phenomena that a subject may apprehend is not
coherent with what is given in ontic experience. Failures to ground positive
phenomena in essential Being have been consistently spurred, I argue, because our
concept of world has not been sufficiently updated to account for the radical
contingency of the event and of ontic experience in general.30

1.2 Fragmentation of the World
To consider the world in its absolute totality is to digress from what is given in ontic
experience. The everydayness of the individual is punctuated by a break from realexisting epistemic certainty in its failure to grasp concrete objects. When Plato seeks
Being in the dialectic he seeks a definition of the world which is not present,
expressive, or manifested, but hidden—a secret knowledge to be gleaned by skillful
logical moves. This classic conception of the subject-position remains in Western
thought today. It presupposes the world of totality in advance of ‘subjective’
apprehension. Kant famously overturned this logic. His ‘Copernican revolution’ re-
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situated the world to within the subject in the form of a critique of the a priori
conditions of possibility that give rise to apprehension of ‘the world’ in the first
instance. Kant sought the universal, and hence, necessary preconditions which govern
the various faculties of knowledge. The a priori conditions of possibility developed
conceptually by Kant fractured the world itself. The self-same Being emanating from a
world of necessity has, post Kant, become a latent conceptual illusion formulated by
the various faculties. Kant did maintain the possibility of wholly determinate concepts
of nature which, properly appraised, might render the world, as a collection of things
in themselves, knowable.31 For Kant, reason differs from aesthetic judgment in that
ideas bear some trace (or sign) of nature (which Kant refers to as ground “for lawful
correspondence” with our satisfaction). The conditions that give rise to
correspondence are found in the field of representation. As such, the world is
constituted not as a set of hidden phenomena expressing a necessary totality, but as a
grouping of natural laws that may fail to find correspondence in the a priori
‘transcendental’ structures of the subject. Kant’s revolution is what has allowed
Deleuze to argue that “representation is a site of transcendental illusion.”32
Knowledge of the world, whether derived from its particulars, or as a concrete
totality within which human cognition persists, begins with the question of grounding.
In a post-Kantian framework, grounding should be understood as the conformity of
things in themselves (the “in-itself) with their adequate representation and possible recreation as expressed by the world and apprehended by the subject (things as they are
“for them-selves”). Kant’s critical project re-situated the locus of possible
understanding of the world as an expressive totality to within the mediative universal
‘transcendental’ structures of the subject. As Deleuze notes: “for Kant the form of the
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illusion (of thought) is more profound. He wants to reach the transcendental root.”33
For an adequate picture of the world to persist, the task of philosophy following Kant
has been the universal attainment of a picture of the world beyond finitude. In sum, by
short-circuiting the fundamental principles of mediation, representation, reflection,
etc., modern philosophy has attempted to regain a picture of the world that seeks to
overcome the limitations defined by Kant. In order to adequately ground a picture of
the world, we have witnessed the rise of so-called ‘speculative realist’ philosophy. This
brand of thought takes as its starting point the world as it presents itself in a positive
manner. We consider this line of inquiry, grounded in experience of the ontic, as
constructing the world in a way that departs from the classical philosophical
conception of the world as a necessary totality. As such, it is more in line with inquiry
pursued by the natural sciences—a focus on the world as a construction of positive
modalities and the laws governing their possibilities.
The structure of subjective apprehension of the world has made only minor
changes since Kant’s Copernican revolution. Accordingly, philosophical and scientific
descriptions of the world tend to develop under a methodological rubric distrustful of
aesthetic, (synthetic) concepts derived of phenomenal experience. At its core, natural
science is a mode of inquiry aimed at positive phenomena but only as ‘effect’.
Governing laws that set the parameters of ‘surface’ possibility make up the
constellation of real-existing objects considered for scientific review. The representation of Ideas, as such, forms a singular line from its epistemological center
toward a conclusive determination regarding its point of genesis. As with the game of
chess, the rules governing the structure of the natural world produce significant
variation—complex emergent phenomena that lack an analytic relation to the law
(rule) that is supposed to have formed it in the first instance. This dynamic produces a
picture of the world with an ‘a priori’ rule-set meant that are meant to explain, but not
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contain, the variable possibilities of play.34 As with Kant’s attempt to reach the
transcendental root, the game of chess analogy serves another purpose: to displace the
question of first causes in favor of an adequate description of the structural forces that
govern the rules of play, offering predictions as to the variability of possible outcomes.
A problem persists: the center point which serves as the proper beginning of any
adequate scientific explanation regarding particulars in the world is never fully selfcontained. No entity contains, as an analytic determination, its essence within its
phenomenal expression. As Derrida writes: “One cannot determine the center and
exhaust its totalization because the sign which replaces the center, which supplements
it, taking the center’s place in its absence—this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a
supplement.”35 The concept of a structured totality is, accordingly, the concept of the
single point of reference predicated on a self-same property.36 We might refer to this
property as the originary real-existing center-point from which Ideas proceed.
Derrida characterizes it as such: “The concept of centered structure is in fact the
concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a
fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of
play.”37 The supplemental nature of an ideational concept presents as a self-same
certitude regarding a particular phenomenon’s essence. As Deleuze writes: “A is A as a
proposition is true and gives us the form of identity, of every analytical proposition.’38
As a point of center, A marks a given phenomenon as a self-enclosed entity. This is
the free play of surface effects, absent a necessary link to a determining world.
However, and as Derrida noted, A is also the form of a proper name that is already
a metaphor: representation marks the intervention of the ‘transcendental’ upon
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whatever eludes the subject in its absolute certainty. The world as presentational
phenomena is supposed to contain within its expression an analytic determination—
one based on a necessary totalized and knowable world. States Derrida:
…the proper names are already no longer proper names, because their
production is already their obliteration, because the erasure and the
imposition of the letter are originary, because they do not supervene
upon a proper inscription; it is because the proper name has never
been, as the unique appellation reserved for the presence of a unique
being, anything but the original myth of a transparent legibility present
under the obliteration; it is because the proper name was never possible
except through its functioning within a classification and therefore
within a system of differences, within a writing retaining the traces of
difference, that the interdict was possible, could come into play, and
when the time came, as we shall see, could be transgressed;
transgressed, that is to say restored to the obliteration and the non-selfsameness (non-proprieté) at the origin.39
Self-sameness marks the ground of particulars that comprises the picture of the world.
Ontic inquiry imposes an imposition: to name A as a self-enclosed, positive entity
that, in its co-mingling, opposition, change, etc. becomes an object of legitimate
thought. The destruction of the logic of the self-same entity proceeding over the
surface of the world returns us to non-sense and to the chaotic background within
which we seek a determinate ground. Hence, in The Logic of Sense Deleuze can
separate the incorporeal (sense) from the corporeal only as an ontic line of inquiry.
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The ‘structure’ of the world, absent surface ‘effects’ dissolves into a chaotic,
inaccessible morass within which all human cognition is dissolved.4041
Our task here is not to discredit the scientific world-view, but instead to offer a
supplement in the form of a critique of its underlying suppositions. My concern is
not, as yet, with the positive representation of the particulars of the world, whether as
real-existing self-enclosed entities, simulacra, or otherwise. What concerns me here is,
for the moment, the background within which positive phenomena emerge. Following
Kant and his successors, I concern myself with the transcendental root of the domain
of the world itself. As Gabriel noted, unless we concede to an absolute embrace of
nothingness, we are forced to make at least one grand presupposition: there is a
background, some negative which is essential to the world, one which produces
positive instantiations of particular phenomena, structured by time in space,
governing human subjective experience. In more theological terms, Schelling writes:
After the eternal act of self-revelation, everything in the world is, as we
see now, rule, order and form; but anarchy still lies in the ground, as if
it could break through once again, and nowhere does it appear as if
order and form were what is original but rather as if initial anarchy had
been brought to order. This is the incomprehensible base of reality in
things, the indivisible remainder, that which with the greatest exertion
cannot be resolved in understanding but rather remains eternally in the
ground. The understanding is born in the genuine sense from that
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which is without understanding. Without this preceding darkness
creatures have no reality; darkness is their necessary inheritance.42
On this view the background world as picture necessarily cannot come in to focus.
The chaotic flows that form the background over which all positive phenomena
emerge engenders an understanding of the purely ideal type. The grounding of
positive phenomena in a totalized and necessary world, in this frame, is given over to
a different quality of the universe: chaos.
In its most radical form, the picture of the world as chaos drains all essential ontic
realisms of the world, repositioning Ideas as ideational constructions. As Deleuze and
Guattari note:
All that the association of ideas has ever meant is providing us with
these protective rules—resemblances, contiguity, causality—which
enable us to put some order into ideas, preventing our “fantasy”
(delirium, madness) from crossing the universe in an instant,
producing winged horses and dragons breathing fire.43
If chaotic, the background over which the play of positive phenomena emerge
engenders an ultimate non-totality. The picture of the world, as such, fragments in to
as many pieces, leaving the grasping subject to a field comprised of illusion and error.
As Deleuze notes: “Do not count on thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it
thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that which forces
thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a
passion to think.”44
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For an adequate picture of the world to emerge, the thing that forces the subject to
think becomes a central concern. Positive phenomena cannot, it seems, emerge
sporadically into whatever mode of apprehension we believe as primary. If indeed the
material of an “outside” consists of an essence, and if indeed our apprehension thereof
consists in a mediated form of representation, then the scientific worldview is on the
right track. However, the inadequacy of a metaphysics of non-mediation relies on a
large supposition, namely, that the noumenon supposedly correlated in thought enjoys
a quality of non-thought whose representation is self-same with some correlating
substance of the mind. The mind, as the mediating mechanism within which material
objects become ‘themselves’ in a representative image would have to disown any
possibility of epistemological error. In short, self-same properties would be
apprehended as given without need for recourse to an epistemological framework
within which these properties make sense. Things would be in-themselves and for
themselves—the subject merely a means of apprehension. A quick glance around the
room reveals this is definitely not the case. Simple objects like plant, or computer
operate as metonymies—placeholders that reduce massive complexity to a short-hand
understanding providing relevance to the subject. Ideas like plant or computer do
share a definite phenomenal coherence, however, which supplies an illusion of
structural necessity. In this way, an object of concern to a subject maintains an
interactive quality. We understand that plant and computer do not enjoy a necessary
structural link—they enjoy no positive phenomenal interaction (outside of an
“accident”). They are incommensurate. However, the singular nature given by
incommensurability does not in itself demonstrate the discreteness of the object in
question. Each plant and each computer suffers the same lack of grounding as any
positive structural relation between the two.

1.3 The World as Being
The most sustained attempt at grounding the world was convincingly offered by
Heidegger in Being in Time (1927), where he argues for a ground of Being within.
Heidegger’s strategy charts Dasein (being-there), as a primary “subject,” existing both
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as its world and “in” the world itself. Heidegger takes up the Kantian challenge and
inverts the subject-object dichotomy that had previously served to limit possible
understanding of the world in its concrete totality. As opposed to a world-picture of
the negative, Heidegger proposes Dasein as a positive instantiation whose privileged
access to logos allows for a world-picture both grounded and essential. As Heidegger
characterizes it: “only because the “senses” belong ontologically to a being whose kind
of being is an attuned being-in-the-world can they be “touched” and “have a sense”
for something so that what touches them shows itself in an affect.”45 Dasein’s
fundamental attunement does not, for Heidegger, look directly at the things in
themselves. Rather, in its “turning away,” Dasein discovers Being through its ‘average
everydayness.’ This mode of discovery is reminiscent of a Platonic understanding of
Being, but whereas Plato posited the genesis of Being as emanating from an
otherworldly One, Heidegger situates Being within the world itself as a fundamental
existential property, grounded in the structure of temporality.
Heidegger’s strategy in Being and Time is to separate authentic from inauthentic
modes of Dasein’s Being, but he is careful to remove any onto-theological
suppositions. In its inauthentic form, Dasein has not fallen from a purer, otherworldly
or perfect Being. Rather, Dasein has “fallen prey to the world which itself belongs to
its being.”46 Heidegger is insistent on proposing Dasein as world. A unique picture of
the world emerges: free from any metaphysical supposition regarding an out there,
Dasein becomes the essential primordial fact of existence, leaving behind any chaotic
negative or background over which the subject emerges.
The fracture of the world is still present within Being and Time. Heidegger’s split of
authentic from inauthentic Being allows him to further a system in which the picture
of the world remains phenomenally inaccessible, but maintains the possibility of a
possible totalized vision of Being:
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To put it negatively, it is beyond question that the totality of the
structural whole is not to be reached phenomenally by means of
cobbling together elements. …the being of Dasein (which supports the
structural whole as such), becomes “accessible” by completely looking
through this whole at a primordially unified phenomenon which
already lies in the whole in such a way that it is the ontological basis for
every structural moment in its structural possibility.
What is relevant for our inquiry is Heidegger’s re-situating of the subject to a primary
position within the ontological order. Rather than assume a chaotic background, in
Being and Time Heidegger opens a space in which apprehension of phenomenal
Being becomes possible.

1.4 The Ontic / Ontological Suppositions of Myth
Whatever the world is, whether totality or chaotic background, some thing forces us
to think. We can provisionally define the world as a domain within which
phenomenal contact proceeds. As opposed to a conception of world relying on the
necessity of its positive phenomena, we consider the world to be, at least in its
provisional definition, a field comprised of epistemologically inaccessible rules that
give rise to ontic experience. If the world is the domain of all domains it must, by
definition, include what we have referred to as the ontological (the Being of all beings).
It is entirely possible that Being marks a concept of pure fantasy or illusion—a surplus
constructed by the imagination in order to suture the persistent lack of sensuous with
any greater meaning. The interpretive mode of human cognition, nonetheless,
persists. Its point of genesis, in our view, is the absurdity of the dynamic that encloses
each subjective relation to the world: the question of the necessity of existence at its
very beginning. “Why is there something rather than nothing?” has been the final
problematic of many philosophers, and indeed, by any metric of human
understanding, an oddity that such a thing as the world should exist. Religious and
technocratic dogma has pursued this question in wild speculatives move, often taking
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as their starting position the ontic ‘world’ as it is perceived.47 The preference for
knowledge of first causes has offered up both onto-theological and scientific
explanations. The latter mode has been quick to diminish the veracity of myth or
legend, while the former tends to suffer unfortunate elaborations on unverifiable
claims.
Mythologies, as opposed to positive scientific explanations for existence, however,
tend to exploit a blind spot persistent in human experience. In mythology, something
of an over-saturation takes place. Judgements of an aesthetic quality tend to guide
foreclosures on the meaning structure of myths or legends. What is lost in this
calculation is the richness of world-historical phenomena as they were presented to a
given subject or set of subjects within bodies and situated in time and space. LéviStrauss poses the following question: “If the content of a myth is contingent, how are
we going to explain the fact that myths throughout the world are so similar?”48 A
world of radical contingency would mark disparate and non-linear phenomena
presenting in unaccountable ways and yet, throughout the world structurally similar
images persist in the mode of mythology. As Lévi-Strauss describes it: “But what gives
myth an operational value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; it explains
the present and the past as well as the future.”49 It is tempting to discount myth as a
complete ideation or as an aesthetic construction of synthetic propositions. The
question for the present work is to ask whether mythological thought, as classically
conceived, illuminates any essential knowledge about the world as such. Despite our
differing conceptual frameworks, it does appear as though, historically, a variety of
‘myths’ across disparate cultures contain a semblance of likeness, enough to warrant
the question of their necessity. It is also possible, as Kant’s project demonstrates, that
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‘universal’ subjective faculties give rise to similar mythologies. If true, the ground
from which these myths appear should be elevated to the status of a structurally
necessary, universal ontic object and a natural space for inquiry. Myths operating as
metaphor, for example, could describe, in a stylistic way, ‘real’ phenomena necessary
to the human-subjective mode of existence. Whether this dynamic says anything
about the world as the domain of domains, as pure Being, or as the
meaningful/meaning-giving entity within which subjective experience plays out, is
another question.
In his anatomy of myth, Lévi-Strauss writes that the true constituent units of myth
are not isolated relations but bundles of such relations, and it is only “as bundles that
these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning.”50 The
primary mode of structural mythology is to offer a universal structure of meaning
under which the subject applies particulars. As a master reference, the myth
(structure) serves as a metaphysical frame under which concrete particulars come into
being. Much in the same mode of thought compared in Plato above, this logic relies
on a necessary totality from which is derived existential ‘meaning.’ In the same
manner as engendered by the scientific worldview, structural mythology intervenes
ahead of the subject, creating the ground over which representational phenomena are
interpreted. The frame sets the point of reference from which meaning is derived. It is
the self-same thing that underwrites phenomenal experience and supplies unity under
a regime of apparent chaos. What differs in a mythological worldview, compared with
that of the scientific worldview, is the admissibility of ontically ‘groundless’
phenomena—illusions and fantasy are given the same ontological status as “facts” of
the world.51 These are moral and philosophical ‘decisions’ that impose a leading
postulate. In other words, it is the radical fixing of an original, self-same object from
which a structure is erected. A confusion generally persists in this dynamic:
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paradoxical or incommensurate ontic facts which contravene the original supposed
self-same object of reference adopt a threatening quality: they oppose not just the
original ground, but the structure constructed on its shoulders. When A is no longer
purely A, the apparatus which binds together sense fractures, along with the ‘world’ it
had previously constituted.52
Mythology is predicated on an originary, self-same and essential product from
which abstractions are made possible. The mythological worldview tends toward a
closed ontology, admitting complex phenomena only with reference to the confines of
its historical precedents. In this sense the predication of an original object or event
that precipitated the dissemination of a given myth adopts the quality of a dogmatism.
The belief in an original event provides the myth structure its justification. Because
the original meaning is supposedly derived a sensuous experience, it is taken on faith
as a factual ground.
The reliance on self-same phenomena lends to the criticism of structural
mythology. Mythology often adopts the character of completion—a belief in the
certainty of an enclosed, self-same, ‘infinite’ event or property pervades the structure
of myth. As Nietzsche notes:
Here one can certainly admire humanity as a mighty architectural
genius who succeeds in erecting the infinitely complicated cathedral of
concepts on moving foundations, or even, one might say, on flowing
water; admittedly, in order to rest on such foundations, it has to be like
a thing constructed from cobwebs, so delicate that it can be carried off
on the waves and yet so firm as not to be blown apart by the wind.53
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Lévi-Strauss’ connection of disparate myths fails to prove a structural certainty. The
structure of mythological thought is twofold: 1) an adherence to the belief in an
original sensuous event which is self-enclosed and necessary, and 2) open to
abstractions which conform to the logic of the original model. The mythological
frame precedes ontic experience as a metaphysical structure. It is at once the faith of
the subject in the veracity of claims made with respect to an original event, and
fidelity with abstractions allowed by the logic of the original model. Nietzsche states:
As a creature of reason, human beings now make their actions subject
to the rule of abstractions; they no longer tolerate being swept away by
sudden impressions and sensuous perceptions; they now generalize all
these impressions first, turning them into cooler, less colourful
concepts in order to harness the vehicle of their lives and actions to
them. Everything which distinguishes human being from animals
depends on this ability to sublimate sensuous metaphors into a schema,
in other words, to dissolve an image into a concept.54
Mythological worldviews tend to posit complete truths—a set of master predicates that
enclose the entirety of the world. An example from Jean-Luc Nancy: “The structure of
all our mythology is the myth of abandonment…”55 This original myth finds its
corresponding allegories not just in the Christian story of the fall of man contained in
the Book of Genesis, but also across other onto-theological systems and within
philosophy itself. Noting Lévi-Strauss, might we argue that the structure of the myth
of the abandonment of man (from Being) adopts the quality of an existential
universal? “The selfsame of the affective soul is the sleeping same that confounds
itself—because it has never distinguished itself, never having been—with the totality of
the other that affects it.”56 It might be the case that myths and metaphors stand in for
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an original representation of a structurally necessary event expressed by the world.
The world as we provisionally defined is the field within which human subjective
experience persists. As such, events contained ‘within the world’ might persist as
ontologically significant entities. However, this logic remains in the conception of the
world presupposed as a necessary totality, and not, as we will argue for in Chapter
Two, as a chaotic background to which the subject applies an artificial unity.
Given the problems at the origin of the proper name and of a concrete center to
any conception of the world, one wonders if any metaphysical system can get us closer
to an adequate picture of the world. As Nietzsche notes:
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies,
anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have
been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and
decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time,
strike a people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are
illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors
which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous
vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal
and no longer as coins.57
Chapter Two will explore the constitution of the world as meaning-giving (expressive)
in a different way. The ‘mythological apparatus’, absent a necessary totalized world,
adopts a different logic, one in which the subject finds the world only through being-in
the world. It is ontic experience, the surface, from which a picture of the world must
be developed. Myth, according to Lévi-Strauss, “gives man, very importantly, the
illusion that he can understand the universe and that he does understand the
universe.” In our view, mythological thought has been ill-conceived as illusion.
Chapter Two will re-situate myth to within ontic experience, not as an ontologically
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necessary entity, but as the closure of the point of confrontation inherited by the
multiplicity of sensuous contact with the world in its conception as chaos.
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Chapter Two: The Mythological I
2.1 The Aleatory Circle in its Ontic-Ontological Character
Myth, with its always circular structure, is indeed the story of a
foundation. It permits the construction of a model according to which
the different pretenders can be judged. What needs a foundation, in
fact, is always a pretension or a claim. It is the pretender who appeals to
a foundation, whose claim may be judged well-founded, ill-founded, or
unfounded.58
The world is a series of phenomenal conditions within which the ‘subject’ finds itself.
Whatever the nature of the composition of the real, the only persistent determinate
ontic modality is the omnipresence of the subject in itself.59 Sensuous contact,
phenomenal flows, reflection and mediation, among others, mark the equiprimordial
conditions within which the subject is located within time and space. Regardless of the
constitutive nature of the subject, the net sum of phenomenal sensation, sensuous
contact, etc. does not indicate a concrete totality fragmented into partial
representations encountered by the ‘subject’, but instead composes a synthetic
construction comprised of contradicting, paradoxical, or nonsensical real or material
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This notion is made explicit by Heidegger throughout Being and Time. I draw here from the sections
(Division One) entitled “The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being” and “The Ontic Priority of
the Question of Being.” Heidegger provisionally defines ontology as the question of the “Being of
beings.” Heidegger writes, “To be ontological does not yet mean to develop an ontology. Thus if we
reserve the term ontology for the explicit, theoretical question of the being of beings, the ontological
character of Dasein referred to here is designated as pre-ontological.” We use ontic to distinguish
between the Being of beings and that which persists as ‘actual’ or real’. In Being and Time Heidegger’s
strategy is to trace the ontic to the ontological (existential) through an analysis of the ‘existentiell’
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philosophies of difference as developed below. Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York:
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flows which the subject brings to bear on the ‘world’ through a given epistemological
framework. We have thus far compared two opposing conceptions of world, and given
a brief explication of the role of myth within the concept of world as a totalized,
knowable and necessary entity. The second chapter of the present work will explore
the ‘myth apparatus’ within the dynamic of ontological chaos, offering a different take
on the conditions of possibility which give rise to ‘mythological’ thought in the first
instance. We do not take aim at a priori subjective structures nor the role of mediation
and reflection, but rather examine myth-making from the starting point of ontic
multiplicity and the event. It is within this dynamic, we will argue, that the conditions
for ontological ‘knowledge’ become possible.
In classical thought, mediation marks the position of the philosophical decision,
the point of ‘free will’. The philosophical decision is the spatio-temporal modality of
the subject as it completes and contains a type of sensuous or empirical event. The
event indicates the point of genesis that presupposes the world as either a complete
but partially inaccessible totality, or as a fragmented, chaotic flux. On the former view,
a determinate, necessary world precedes the subject ahead of mediation or
philosophical decision. The world, in this sense, persists as an objective real or
material thing awaiting discovery and classification. On the latter view, the world is
understood as a synthetic unity grafted on to the chaotic flows of a contingent
universe.60
To understand the world as a series of chaotic ‘events,’ underwritten by material or
real forces which gives rise to an ideational unity is to glimpse the world of pure ontic
contingency. Chaos engenders multiplicity—the opening of ontic experience to the
totality of possible outcomes contained within the event. The aleatory point marks the
position of the chaotic multiple in its absolute ideational form. When one imagines
throwing the dice, for example, the aleatory point names the position of the
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multiplicity of every possible outcome, governed in turn by ontic rules. As Deleuze
defines it: “An aleatory point is displaced through all the points on the dice, as though
one time for all times.”61 In the case of the dice throw, a set of presupposed rules
govern the conditions of possibility for every outcome contained within the precursor
to the throw. The aleatory point names that point that includes the distributive
possibility of every dice throw, every car speed, every lottery pick, etc. As Deleuze
characterizes it:
The games with which we are acquainted respond to a certain number
of principles, which may take the object of a theory. This theory applies
equally to games of skill and to games of chance; only the nature of the
rules differs. 1)It is necessary that in every case a set of rules preexists
the playing of the game, and, when one plays, this set takes on a
categorical value; 2)these rules determine hypotheses which divide and
apportion chance, that is, hypotheses of loss or gain (what happens
if…); 3)These hypotheses organize the playing of the game according to
a plurality of throws, which are really and numerically distinct. Each of
them brings about a fixed distribution corresponding to one case or
another. 4)the consequences of the throws range over the alternative
“victory or defeat.” The characteristics of normal games are therefore
the preexisting categorical rules, the distributing hypotheses, the fixed
and numerical distinct distributions, and the ensuing results.62
The aleatory point is fundamentally ontic—it exists within a set of preconditions that
govern the rules of the game. It is also, however, ideational: the conditions of
possibility for the multitude of outcomes contained within the aleatory point persist
only insofar as the game play remains suspended with respect to time and space. The
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moment the dice is thrown marks the moment of foreclosure of the aleatory point,
along with the conditions of possibility contained in the multiplicity. We refer to this
movement of the aleatory moment through to the point of ‘philosophical decision’ as
the aleatory circle.63
The event names the point of sensuous contact between subject and world, the
aleatory moment names the multiplicity of ontic possibility created by the event, and
the aleatory circle names the dissolution of the possible through philosophical
decision—an ontic necessity which simultaneously ‘completes’ the event, dissolving
the multitude of possibilities contained within the aleatory moment. This ontic
completion closes the aleatory circle by way of the free play of the decision-process of
the subject, which serve to demonstrate the radically contingent character of the
‘outcome’ of the aleatory circle.64

63

I refer here to the ‘philosophical decision’ with an understanding that chance dictates the conditions
of the outcome of the aleatory moment. I use philosophical decision to indicate the point of free will of
the subject: the point of (moral) intervention which (necessarily) forecloses on the aleatory circle and
the multitude contained within. I use philosophical decision because the ideational quality of
representation (say, for example, in a number on a dice throw) is indicative of ontic contingency. I
distinguish my concept of the philosophical decision from François Laruelle, who defines it as “…an
operation of transcendence that believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of unitary
discourse of the Real.” “Philosophical decision as structure involves the coupling, then the Unity, of
contraries, and its function is to hallucinate the One-real and to foreclose it in this way. To philosophize
is to decide on the Real and on thought, which ensues from it, ie., to believe to be able to align them with
the universal order of the principle of sufficient philosophy.” François Laruelle, Dictionary of
NonPhilosophy, trans. Taylor Adkins (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2013), 117.
64
Here I distinguish the neologism ‘aleatory circle’ from Heidegger’s hermeneutic understanding of
knowledge. With respect to scientific inquiry he states, “Fundamental concepts are determinations in
which the area of knowledge underlying all the thematic objects of a science attains an understanding
that precedes and guides all positive investigation. Accordingly these concepts first receive their genuine
evidence and “grounding” only in a correspondingly preliminary research into the area of knowledge
itself. But since each of these areas arises from the domain of beings themselves, this preliminary
research that creates the fundamental concepts amounts to nothing else than interpreting these beings
in terms of the basic constitution of their being.” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 9) The aleatory circle is
characterized by the ontic multiplicity, or governing rules which give definition to a finite set of possible
outcomes. It is not a fundamental positive postulate (ground) from which a determinate outcome may
proceed. The aleatory circle is a structure of another kind: grounded only in sensuous empirical contact
with ontic multiplicity. It the position of truncated ontological possibility and its ultimate necessary ontic
foreclosure—a meeting point of time, space, and the body within the conditions of ontic possibility.
Heidegger’s concept of the hermeneutic circle does mirror aspects of the aleatory circle as a ‘necessary
fore-structure’: “The circle of understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of knowledge
operates, but it is rather the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself.” (Being and
Time, 148). Though I agree with Heidegger in the ‘necessity’ of the circle as an essential fore-structure of
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The subject names the concept of the locus of the experience of time and space. The
conjugation of time and space refers to an ontically contingent movement of relative
indeterminacy. The subject encounters the world in its chaotic complexity, not as a
structured totality, but rather as a movement of forces that operate in a quasideterminate mode. This mode is characterized by the interplay of time, space, and
corporeality. Corporeality determines a set of ontic principles that play out necessarily
in time and space. Bodies require particularities relative to biological determinations:
sustenance, rest, movement, excitation, etc. These attributes, taken as given or
‘natural’, rely on the capacity of the corporeal subject to enact its will in the world in
order for the ‘subject’ to persist in time and space. For our purposes, ‘will’ names a
metonymy which designates the relationship of the subject to the flow of ‘natural’
forces which give rise to the ‘effects’ of subjectivity as such.65
The event marks the opening of an ontic decision-process that is ‘determined’ by
the modalities of corporeality. The corporeal body is demonstrative of a set of
becoming properties inherent to biological existence as experienced in its ontic mode.
Time and space govern possible experience of the body, but do not fully determine the
reflective quality of mediation. There is no analytic governance with respect to the
interaction between body, ‘mind’, and time and space. As such, when one encounters
‘the world’, we suppose that a multiplicity of possible corporeal determinations is
opened along with the ontological conditions for all possibility. As Deleuze
characterizes it:

the subject, I disagree that it contains an essential ontological quality. The aleatory circle relies on the
contingency of the encounter, and not on any essential, necessary or universal characteristics of the
subject which give definition to empirical contact. The ‘necessity’ of the fore-structure is, in all
probability, a corporeal difference which we observe in non-human animals and the sensory apparatus
of plants or other ‘non-sentient’ beings. The key difference for the human subject lies in the mediation
between empirical contact and the interpretation of events. See Chapter Three for a discussion on the
role of representation and reflection.
65
I set aside, for the moment, the complex relationship between the subject, the corporeal body, natural
forces or flows, and desire as such, instead focusing on the mediation of subject, body, and the
multiplicity of the aleatory certain which traverses the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’.

37
We have seen that past, present, and future were not all three parts of a
single temporality, but that they rather formed two readings of time,
each one which is complete and excludes the other: on the one hand,
the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as
causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other,
the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal
events, at the surface, as effects (Aion).66
The ontologically infinite event contained within the finite state of affairs is
presupposed as an a priori condition of experience—of the event of the bodily
encounter itself. In its sensuous mode, the corporeal body acts as the locus within
which ontic time proceeds. This contact also includes the ontological conditions of all
possibility with respect to time—the position of pure potentiality thought as an
imaginative real. Deleuze understands the surface as the point of convergence of the
infinite, the gathering point of ontic, linear time with time immemorial. The
governance of the faculty of the imagination births the concept of the world as infinite
time by suturing partial ontic determinations into a cohesive ‘whole.’ Hence, a
mythological epistemological apparatus precedes the subject in a repetitive mode. The
ontic quality of the linear nature of time as experienced by the body adapts the subject
to the worldly state of chaos through the constitution of a synthetic mythological
apparatus—a constitutive and constituted ‘structure’ that correlates to sensuous
experience, but lacks original ground in a self-same property.
The repetition constituting the myth apparatus emerges through the interplay of
partially determinate concepts—it is a synthetic proposition that grafts the ‘objects’ of
linear sensuous experience—the outcome of the aleatory circle and the foreclosure of
the event—on to the world as a perceived, necessary totality. In a sense, the myth
structure both precedes and proceeds the subject, simultaneously absorbing and
dissolving empirical difference in a linear procession in time, while also reinforcing
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the repetitive structural constitution of the apparatus itself. In the absence of the
proper name, of the original model or self-same thing, the subject, in its corporeal
existence, subjugates ontic difference to the false principal of the repetition of essence.
As such, the mythological apparatus contains the multiple only insofar as it can be
brought to heel under an epistemological frame of reference. The presupposition of
self-same objects subordinates difference to repetitive ontic rules, dissolving the
multiple while constituting the governing structure of the myth apparatus. What
emerges is the world of what Deleuze would call common sense, of short-hand ontic
rules that simultaneously forecloses both the ontic multiple and the ontological
conditions of all possibility.
Not only does thought appropriate the ideal of an ‘orthodoxy’, not only
does common sense find its object in the categories of opposition,
similitude, analogy and identity, but error itself implies this
transcendence of a common sense with regard to sensations, and of a
soul with regard to all the faculties whose collaboration [syllogismos] in
relation to the form of the Same it determines.67
At the outset, the aleatory point is a point of the multiple—of the disruption and
displacement of ontic repetition, of the erasure of the apparatus in advance of its resuturing upon the closing of the aleatory circle in a moral or philosophical decision.
We refer to the concept of moral or philosophical decision to mark the foreclosure on
both the ontological preconditions for the aleatory moment, as well as a closing off of
the multiplicity of possible ontic outcomes—the erasure of the aleatory moment and
the closing of the possibility for free play by the subject.
As a rule, the mythological apparatus constitutes the subject in two modes: 1) as the
arbiter of clarification and ‘meaning’ with respect to ontic repetition, and 2) as the
guarantor of safety for the subject against the onslaught of ontological chaos. The
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agnostic mode of thought modifies the mythological apparatus, creating a set of
preconditions lacking determination as a baseline for general understanding. In its
theistic mode, the philosophical decision adopts the quality of synthetic deduction:
ontic properties of empirical events are sutured to create an a posteriori construction.
We refer to these dogmatisms as aesthetic in nature. What Kant refers to as the
synthetic application of partially determinate concepts68 (those which lack an analytic
deduction, grounded in nature), we position as the synthetic collaboration of a linear
series of philosophical decisions made in the ontic mode. The ‘repetition’ of the
foreclosure of the aleatory circle, the abandonment of the multiple in favor of a
repetition of the ‘same’, constitutes the myth apparatus with positive, collaborative
and correlated ‘reasons’ for belief. In short, the event, which is characterized by the

sensuous, bodily encounter of the subject with the ‘world’, is the foundation for the
construction of the theistic mythological apparatus. This logic depends on the
foreclosure of the conditions of all possibility in favor of an aesthetic determination of
positive value. In this sense, the concept of God persists as an ontic construction
grounded not in the ontological opening of all possibility, but rather in the repetition
of the conditions of the philosophical or moral decision. Sense-phenomena that lack
determinacy are characterized by an ontic multiplicity which, when (necessarily)
closed, forms the basis for an apparatus comprised of partially determinate concepts.
The ground of this type of aesthetic Idea is, as Kant rightly described, indeterminate:
In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination,
associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a
manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination
that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for
it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is
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unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and
combines spirit with the mere letter of language.69
Losing one’s faith describes the return to the free play of the moral or philosophical
decision with respect to its ground—the de-ranging or de-suturing that opens the
stitches binding ontic repetition. It is only through affirmation that the closure of the
aleatory circle occurs, constructing the basis for the myth apparatus. In the absence of
affirmation, the subject confronts the nature of chaos in all its radical contingency.
This lack demonstrates the ideational quality of affirmation with respect to
corporeality in its ontic mode. Deleuze characterizes the ideational quality of
affirmation as follows:
Each thought emits a distribution of singularities. All of these thoughts
communicate in one long thought, causing all the forms or figures of
the nomadic distribution to correspond to its own displacement,
everywhere insinuating chance and ramifying each thought, linking the
“once and for all” to “each time” for the sake of “all time.” For only
thought finds it possible to affirm all chance and to make chance into an
object of affirmation. If one tries to play this game other than in
thought, nothing happens; and if one tries to produce a result other
than the work of art, nothing is produced. This game, which can only
exist in thought and which has no other result other than the work of
art, is also that by which thought and art are real and disturbing reality,
morality, and the economy of the world.70
Value denotes the preferred corporeal consequence of the philosophical decision,
which serves to banish the multiplicity of the aleatory moment through affirmation.

69

Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 194.
70
(Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 60)

41
The subject self-affirms, bringing coherence and unity where only chaos persists. In its
repetitive mode, the myth apparatus provides the rationale for the moral or
philosophical decision, based on the supposition of a totalized, necessary world within
which the essence of objects eternally returns.71
It is here that the concept of humour exposes the fundamental contingency
characterizing value judgment as such. Humour serves to dissolve the ‘necessary’ link
between ontic multiplicity and the affirmation of the philosophical or moral decision.
It operates as the reversal of the philosophical decision and the re-opening of the
aleatory in imaginative form. Ironic satire, pastiche, impressions rend the stitches of
ontic repetition and glimpse the aleatory moment and its ontological conditions of
possibility. As Deleuze notes:
Humour is the art of the surfaces and of the doubles of Nomad
singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point; it is the art of
static genesis, savoire-faire of the pure event and the “fourth person
singular”—with every signification, denotation, and manifestation
suspended, all height and depth abolished.72
Affirmation contains the conditions for the dissolution of the aleatory moment.
Affirmation relies on the supposition of a governing world within which repetition is
representative of causal determinacy.73 Humour intervenes on behalf of chaos and
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Here I conceive of affirmation in a manner which departs from Deleuze. For Deleuze, affirmation
adopts a joyous quality, affirming difference, disparity, and decentering over the subordination of
difference to the identity of concepts and the return of the Same. See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition,
288. In my conception, affirmation marks the closure of the multiple and the constitution of the myth
apparatus. Deleuze also characterizes affirmation with respect to the “univocity of Being: “The univocity
of Being merges with the positive use of the disjunctive synthesis which is the highest affirmation. It is
the eternal return itself, or—as we have seen in the case of the ideal game—the affirmation of all chance
in a single moment, the unique cast for all throws, one Being and only for all forms and all times, a
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serves as a reminder of ontic multiplicity and the contingency of the subject-position
relative to the event in its temporal phases. The corporeal body, which is supposed to
ground necessary ontological conditions, is exposed as a contingent phenomenon
whose modalities mirror that of randomness. The myth apparatus covers over this
dynamic by stitching indeterminate ontic concepts together by way of repetition of
the philosophical or moral decision, which are themselves a function of a rationality
based on value judgments founded in the ‘best practices’ of the corporeal body. In this
sense, myths precede the ontic, but not the ontological. The ontological—the
background noise which gives rise to the modalities of the ontic, is effaced in favor of a
structure whose supposed determinacy lies in the ‘necessary’ conditions of the
corporeal body.

2.2 Chance, or the Condition of the Aleatory
“Nothing is exempt from the game,” writes Deleuze, “consequences are not subtracted
from chance by connecting them with a hypothetical necessity which would tie them
to a determinate fragment; on the contrary, they are adequate to the whole of chance,
which retains and subdivides all possible consequences.”74 The philosophical decision
is the closure of the opening of all possibility and the return to the ontic mode. The
whole of chance names the condition of all possibility absent its corporeal conditions.

single instance for all that exists, a single phantom for all the living, a single voice for every hum of
voices and every drop of water in the sea.” (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 179-180). We depart here from
Deleuze in his logic of the surface and his positioning of the primacy of the ontic, of factual existence,
and the ontological, the Being of beings as a concrete totality. For Deleuze in The Logic of Sense, only
non-sense persists relative to the surface, which forecloses on the possibility of ontological knowledge. In
his scheme, the event, as an ideal entity, cannot yield ontological knowledge due to its ideal nature.
Deleuze encloses the surface as follows: “Univocal Being inheres in language and happens to things; it
measures the internal relation of Being. It is extra-Being, that is, the minimum of Being common to the
real, the possible, and the impossible. A position in the void of all events in one, an expression in the
nonsense of all senses in one, univocal Being is the pure form of Aion, the form of exteriority which
relates things and propositions. In short, the univocity of Being has three determinations: one single
event for all events; one and the same aliquid for that which happens and that which is said; and one
and the same Being for the impossible, the possible, and the real.” (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 180)
74
(Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 283)

43
When choosing option A over option B, the subject closes the circle within which
all possible decisions are contained. In this way, the constraints of time and space,
which act either on or within the subject, become real, dividing the infinite into the
finite and generating a series grounded in the repetition of the philosophical or moral
decision. The totality of the game contains not only the infinite possibility of its
ontological genesis, it also includes each possible completion of the ontic
philosophical or moral decision as part of its ‘structure’. This structure is one of ontic
commitment—of the quasi-necessity of the subject as a corporeal entity persisting in
time and space. The affirmation or philosophical decision that relinquishes the
aleatory point from its privileged ontological position forecloses on the multiplicity of
seen and unseen possibility. Affirmation marks the point of enclosure that completes
the ontological-to-ontic movement from all possibility to one of corporeal
contingency. This aleatory circle is the primordial mode of the subject-position
thrown into ontic necessity. If the world is characterized by chaotic flows within
which a synthetic unified subject persists, then the aleatory circle marks a point of
ontological-ontic confrontation that serves to express the absolute contingency of the
subject-position. On the other hand, if the world were a structured and necessary
totality, partially graspable by the subject, the aleatory circle would instead mark the
place of the encounter or contact with partial determinate fragments of the world in
its ontological necessity. This split determines two modes of mythological thought.
In the first mode, the encounter with a totalized structural and necessarily whole
world positions the subject within a strict truth / falsity dichotomy. In this
formulation, mythology denotes the position of the false—that which lacks
correspondence with the necessary world in its totality. Myths become abstractions or
fantasies lacking reference to empirical phenomena whose ground persist within the
totalized world. The history of Western thought has privileged this epistemological
mode, preferring a moral admonition that elevates the primacy of the self-same model
above the groundless copy. This conceptual apparatus is the original framework that
assumes the world in its concrete totality. In his review of Plato, Deleuze notes:
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The whole of Platonism, by contrast, is dominated by the idea of
drawing a distinction between 'the thing itself' and the simulacra.
Difference is not thought in itself but related to a ground, subordinated
to the same and subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning
Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of
model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.75
In the second mode of mythological thought, the subject of ideational unity, bringing
synthetic, aesthetic, or moral cohesion to a non-totalized or radically contingent
nominalist world, forms a mythological apparatus which is itself constitutive of the
subject as such. Using a series of ‘short-hand’—metonymies, allegories, religious
symbolism, etc.—the myth apparatus provides an epistemological framework within
which ideational repetition proceeds. On the latter view, mythology adopts the quality
of a groundless structure, applying the rules of synthetic deduction in the construction
of the mythological apparatus. The aleatory circle, on this view, conceptualizes the
conditions for the encounter of a non-totalizeable ontological chaos with its ontic
counterpart: the corporeal. The mythological apparatus is the series of repetitive
philosophical decisions—moral, synthetic unities of consistent enclosures constituting
the unity of the subject. Myth is the grafting of this apparatus on to the ‘event’ of the
aleatory circle in its ontic mode ahead of the event’s meaningful interpretation played
out in time.
In a totalized, necessary world, the mythological apparatus loses its consistency.
Error or falsity mark the master concepts for objects either included in an ontic
schema or banished to the realm of fantasy or illusion. Within this logic, ‘mythologies’
become the post-facto position of the subject of the unreal—of that which lacks
correspondence to the totality of the world as given in ontic experience.
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In its empirical mode, mythologies that persist independent of the necessary world
adopt the quality of non-sense—no correlate presents to ground or determine a
mythological concept, and no persistent ‘rule’ to govern their necessity. Within the
fractured world of chaos, mythology necessarily precedes the subject. The synthetic
unity grafted on to indeterminate ontological conditions by the subject opens up a
field of sense within which events are interpreted. As Kant interprets this as follows:
The aesthetic idea (archetype, prototype) is for both grounded in the
imagination; the shape, however, which constitutes its expression
(ectype, afterimage) is given either in its corporeal extension (as the
object itself exists) or in accordance with the way in which the latter is
depicted in the eye (in accordance with its appearance on a plane); or
else, whatever the former is, either the relation to a real end or just the
appearance of one is made into a condition for reflection.76
The aleatory circle demonstrates both the transcendental ontological conditions for
the possibility of the infinite, while simultaneously foreclosing on this possibility in
the movement of the ontically-necessary philosophical or moral decision. The aleatory
circle contains both the creation and the destruction of the ontological through its
‘opening’ of the ontological conditions which precede the multiplicity of the aleatory
point and the ‘closing’ of these conditions necessarily in time. There can be no
suspension of the aleatory circle outside of a pure ideation that considers the
multiplicity of the aleatory point as its own, real-existing object. It is an object that is
only ever an instance of the possibility of a repetition of a different type, of the free
play of the subject within a set of given parameters prescribed in advance. It is,
however, a contingent object grounded only in the meeting point of the corporeal,
time, and space.
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In order to ground a concept of a totalized world, the subject relies on the
supposition of the existential necessity of the ontic experience of time and space.
Rather, corporeality, in its finite and fractured determinations, demonstrates both the
conditions of the ontologically all possible and the ontically impossible. Far from
determining the world as a structural necessity, the aleatory circle posits a multiplicity
that is contained within the radical finitude of ontic contingency. Myth enters as the
constitution of a ‘world’ within a series of 'repeating’, yet contingent phenomena—
based specifically on corporeal conditions. Hence, when Heidegger seeks to ground
the concept of Being within a temporal structure, he relies on a classical view of the
world as a necessary totality within which the subject discovers ontological necessity
(‘Being-there’).77 As we have noted, however, the aleatory circle radicalizes ontic
contingency and demonstrates the reliance of the structure of time as one of corporeal
determination, itself a constituent part of the mythological apparatus. As such, the
conceptualization of time as ontologically necessary and determinate of ontic
contingency reveals itself as a subjective presupposition of the world as a concrete
totality. In the absence of this totality, the concept of time re-inhabits its place as one
other in a countless chain of indeterminate ontic phenomena whose only ground
appears in corporeal experience. As Deleuze characterizes the experience of
subjectivity in time:
Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox
of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a
passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts
it, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it
like an Other within itself. To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the self
- that is, the passive position (what Kant calls the receptivity of
intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added
the form of the determinable, namely time. Nor is 'add' entirely the
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right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference
and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the I were
fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty
form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which

appears in time. Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a
passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the
fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element
of the Copernican Revolution.78
Deleuze’s fractured I is precisely the opening within which the confrontation of the
ontological with the ontic plays out in the aleatory circle. Time reveals its own
indeterminacy while simultaneously illuminating the conditions for its ontic
possibility: the fractured I which presupposes time as ontologically given. Likewise,
the world as a concrete totality demands the fidelity of time to its necessary structure.
It is within time that the model of the world expresses its necessities. What is
expressed, however, are not the representations of a knowable, fixed, totalized world,
but instead a reality in which modally different expressions impress upon passive
subjects in a sensuous mode. The locus of this confusion lies at the confrontation
between the ontological and the ontic, demonstrated in the aleatory circle.
The mythological apparatus of serialized repetitive events presents an
overdetermined epistemology—ontically necessary, repetitive, moral or philosophical
decisions encase the fractured I within a fantasy framework, one which abolishes the
multiplicity—the pure, ideational aleatory moment—in favor of a theory of varying
consequences.
The phenomenon of Regret enters as an attuned sensuous remainder indicating
that the philosophical decision can never re-fold itself back into the multiplicity of the
aleatory point. The superposition of the aleatory marks an atemporal ontic necessity—
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it is always determined by circumstance of a corporeal character. However, regret also
informs the subject of the transcendental conditions of all possibility. In the moment
of dissolution of the multiplicity (necessarily), the subject glimpses the transcendental
conditions for the possibility of the ontologically all possible. It is because we make the
aleatory circle an object of relevant inquiry that we are able to understand that which
might be otherwise. Because difference is the first priority of the world, the subject
stretches out its cognition in advance, anticipating possible difference before it
becomes ‘real.’ This dynamic often results in transcendental error, but also allows the
construction of alternative ontological conceptions of the world, and inaugurates the
question of existence in the first instance.
Despite the enclosure of the ontologically infinite within the ontically necessary,
the aleatory circle which includes both the “problem” and its possible “solution” is
never a self-enclosed totality, containing both the aleatory point which characterizes
the philosophical decision, and the affirmation or completion. Completion marks a
temporal moral imposition of a subject of unique experience, and generally adopts the
form of “I chose to do this because…” This because marks the conjugation of
experience with a synthetic proposition. Despite the ontological opening created by
the aleatory circle, which allows the subject to glimpse the conditions of all possibility,
the ontic necessity of time determines the constitution of the mythological subject in
advance of the event. The because of the philosophical decision relies on a predicate
which contains both the repetition of the mythological apparatus, itself constituted by
empirical precedence, and the ontological glimpse of all possibility contained in every
sensuous encounter. Deleuze notes:
In depth, it is through infinite identity that contraries communicate
and that the identity of each finds itself broken and divided. This makes
each term at once the moment and the whole; the part, the relation, and
the whole; the self, the world, and God; the subject, the copula, and the
predicate. But the situation is altogether different at the surface where
only infinitive events are deployed; each one communicates with the
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other through the positive characters of its distance and by the
affirmative character of the disjunction.79
The locus of ontological difference is the interplay of the ontological with the ontic
contained within the circle of the aleatory point and the philosophical decision. The
indeterminacy of the ontological all possible is inscribed within the closure of the
aleatory circle. In its philosophical ‘decision-making,’ the mythological apparatus
preceding every sensuous encounter is further constituted as a repetitive motif. As
such, the ontological all possible is diminished in favor of what is ‘real.’ Hence, the
constitution of the subject relies on repetition of a presupposed same (the decision) as
a type of ‘world building’. The world, in this sense, is not constituting, but rather
constitutive of (the subject).
Mythology, misunderstood as a lack of correlation to that which is real, is confused
within the dynamic of the interplay between the ontological and the ontic discovered
in the aleatory circle. On this view, phenomena that fail to correspond to the
repetitions of the dominant mythological apparatus are considered fantastical or
otherwise. The weakness of the scientific worldview is a reliance on the supposition of
the ontic as necessary—correlated to a totalized and knowable world in which the
subject persists. Reductionism is the concept for those methods privileging the givens
of ontic experience over the dynamic of the aleatory circle in its exposure of the all
possible. If affirmation were to contain an analytic judgment, it would be expressed
within a self-enclosed epistemic certainty. The necessity of the question—the
superposition of the aleatory point—consists in a prior determination given in
experience. As Deleuze notes:
Whereas Analytics gives us the means to solve a problem already given,
or to respond to a question, Dialectics shows how to pose a question
legitimately. Analytics studies the process by which the syllogism
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necessarily leads to a conclusion, while Dialectics invents the subjects
of syllogisms (precisely what Aristotle calls ‘problems’) and engenders
the elements of syllogisms concerning a given subject (‘propositions’).80
A closed totality would demonstrate epistemic certainty of a particular kind, one
which constitutes the subject based on the richness of corporeal experience only,
rather than what we observe: a constitution of the self based on the conjugation of
experience with synthetic proposition. When the subject faces the philosophical
decision, it cannot be experience alone that dictates affirmation. In the case of brute
experience, a teleological analytic science could easily replace philosophical ethics as
the primary mode of inquiry into the philosophical decision. If indeed experience
marks the suture of the world in its expressive mode with the sense-proposition of a
subject persisting in time and space, we would encounter a multitude of pure analytic
determinations. Properties of the world, given in its positive form, rather than present
as paradoxical or aporetic, would express a formal grouping of phenomena given to
their natural essence. In his work on sense Deleuze notes: “Paradox is opposed to
doxa, namely, good sense and common sense. Now, good sense is said of one direction
only: it is the unique sense and expresses the demand of an order according to which it
is necessary to choose one direction and to hold onto it.”81 In our language, paradox
represents the incommensurability of variable ontic philosophical or moral decisions
played out in time and space and serialized within the subject. This logic relies on the
necessary closure of the aleatory moment, which contains its own form of paradox:
that of the impossibility of the containment of the multiplicity outside an ideational
arrangement. The ‘necessities’ which constitute the myth apparatus are fundamental
doxa—the formation of a grouping of reductions which serve to eliminate the
possibility of the otherwise. “It could not have been otherwise” is the cultural motif
enamored with the mythological apparatus and the good sense from which it derives its
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rationale. Paradox always threatens the fictitious ground of good sense and of doxa,
marking the return of the multiple and of the otherwise. Two or more incommensurate
ontic philosophical or moral decisions may only co-exist in a subjective apparatus that
embraces the moment of the multiple and of pure, ideational ontic possibility
engendered by the aleatory.
Experience denotes a sensuous measure of partial or indeterminate contingent
objects, consistently at odds with one another. As opposed to an analytic mode of
perception, the subject draws on its wealth of experience of partial and paradoxical
elements to inform a philosophical decision, subsuming this experience within a
synthetic proposition. This conjunction of experience with what Kant referred to as
transcendental structures marks the philosophical decision as a fundamentally
affirmative mode. The aleatory point, which contains the multiplicity of possible
outcomes, is thus modified in two ways: 1) under the diktats of a historico-subjective
experience that is governed exclusively by sensuous modes of time and space, and 2)
within an ideal synthetic proposition—an iterative, non-causal, positive imposition
grafted on to the world of experience as a means toward closing the perennial
openness of the aleatory point. This moment of synthetic proposition marks the locus
for the inquiry into the modalities that characterize mythological thought. As a quasideterminate empirical mode, the event of the affirmation of the aleatory point away
from its openness and toward its foreclosure in synthetic proposition is none other
than the application of the generation and repetition of the mythological apparatus
governing the subject in time and space. Consider Schelling:
Determinism counters this system of equilibrium of free will and,
indeed, with complete justification, since it claims the empirical
necessity of all actions because each is determined by representations
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or other causes that lie in the past and that no longer remain within our
power during the action itself.82
One regrets a decision when the opportunity for perceived beneficial experience has
been decidedly closed. The abandonment of the aleatory point takes the form of the
determined affirmation—a singular decision that serves to reduce the multiplicity of
the aleatory to a mono-logical event. This mode of the event arrives, however, by way
of an ontic temporal necessity: the openness of the aleatory point persists solely as an
atemporal entity containing every possible outcome of decision. The philosophical
decision marks the ontic temporal point within which the circle of the multiplicity of
the aleatory point is closed with its necessary outcome. Though the outcome is
differential—allowing for variation across the multiplicity of possible outcomes, the
aleatory point-to-philosophical-decision apparatus is an ontic necessity—a closed
circle within which the entire ‘structure’ of the temporal event is contained. This
structure is seemingly determined in advance of the subject by time and space,
appearing phenomenally as an ontic necessity, and grounding the event of
philosophical decision within a transcendental apparatus. In this conception, the
event precedes the subject as a real-existing entity of unknown determination.
Something forces the subject to think. “This object is an object not of recognition,”
writes Deleuze,
What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be
grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In
whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed.
In this sense it is opposed to recognition. In recognition, the sensible is
not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly
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upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or
conceived.83
It is often presupposed that this thing marks a determinate ground—material or
otherwise—which coerces the ‘subject’ into action related to the event. As such, the
basis for empirical analysis grounds itself within the structure of the relationship
between that which forces the subject to consider, and the subject as a transcendental
framework of perception which interprets the ground according to rules fixed in time
and space.
Problems persist in time and space as a quasi-determined extension of corporeality,
itself a product of a seemingly essential ontic necessity. The production of difference
within corporeal existence relates to two specific ontic modes: time and space, each of
which serves as a governing ‘cause’ of ‘effects’ experienced by the body. Thus, the
body, as the locus of the aleatory point and the philosophical decision, enjoys a
privileged status with respect to epistemological understanding. The perceived
necessity of time and space marks a reduction of the differential modes of the subject
to within the enclosure of the event as characterized by the aleatory circle. The body is
the center of sensuous contact with the ‘world’—a field of contact within which time
and space proceed. Space is the correlate concept of bodily movement—its excitations,
enjoyment, pain etc. Time is the unique force adding relevance to the subjective
encounter, acting as the moderator of meaning with respect to the sensuous
encounter of body with space. These two ontic ‘necessities’ birth the modulations of
the mythological apparatus and ground ontic experience. As such, the ‘world’
expresses itself only insofar as it may be interpreted within a dynamic framework
enclosed within the confines of time and space. Analysis of the fluctuations which
inhere in the relationship between time, space, and the body, we refer to as empirical
inquiry.
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The first postulate of the empirical mode of analysis is the abandonment of the
variation of possible ontological difference in favor of a metaphysics of the event and
its genesis. The aleatory circle emerges as the result of the event, which demands the
subject to consider the world as a concrete, observable and experiential object,
forgetting the non-ground of the aleatory moment which fixes the multiple in time
and space. Within empirical metaphysics corporeal sensuous experience is
presupposed as the underwriter of the phenomenon of the event. Within the
multiplicity of possibility the beginning and end of ground is the body, through which
the world expresses its essential properties. As such, corporeality enjoys a privileged
position within the hierarchy of human understanding. Phenomena of possible
concern are thus inscribed within a serialized mode: reference to the event and its
outcome persist within a repetitive ideation that reduces the multiplicity of the
aleatory to the mark of its preferred outcomes—specifically those with historical
precedent. Deleuze is correct, therefore, in his definition of repetition as an original
means of mediating difference in itself. As Deleuze notes: “Repetition is never a
historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is
effectively produced.”84 And, as Deleuze notes,85 the moment of repetition is the
moment of ideational foreclosure: when the philosophical decision is made, closing
the aleatory circle, repetition emerges as the moral ‘lesson’, or in more refined
terminology, as the creation of a fundamental mythology. As the closure of the
aleatory moment with the philosophical decision an original ‘repetition’ finds its ontic
genesis. As a serialization of linear historical moments, the generative function of the
aleatory circle becomes clear: the philosophical or moral decision, itself an ontic
necessity resulting from the closure of the multiplicity—itself encountered as
temporal necessity through another ontic necessity: corporeality—constitutes a
grouping of ideal moral lessons which themselves inform the mythological apparatus.
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Deleuze writes:
The role of the imagination, or the mind which contemplates in its
multiple and fragmented states, is to draw something new from
repetition, to draw difference from it. For that matter, repetition is
itself in essence imaginary, since the imagination alone here forms the
‘moment’ of the vis repetitiva from the point of view of constitution: it
makes that which it contracts appear as elements or cases of
repetition.86
To grasp the concept of the aleatory enclosure is to glimpse the relative ‘universal’
simplicity of corporeal existence. The body, situated as an ontic necessity within time
and space, functions as the ground over which phenomenal moments proceed. It is no
coincidence, then, that the gambler archetype enjoys a particular position of scorn
within bourgeois rationality. The gambler exposes the perceived necessary condition
of the aleatory enclosure as one of corporeal contingency. At once satirizing the
groundlessness of economic determinism, while simultaneously demonstrating the
contingent character of corporeal determination, the gambler, in a single throw of the
dice, forecloses on the possibility of ontic subjective superposition—with bodies like
these and time like that, the gambler demonstrates the impossibility of maintaining
the multiplicity of the aleatory moment and illuminates the conditions for the
openness of ontological all possibility. Even in its limited sense, bound by
determinations of time, space, bodies, and rules, the affirmation of the dice throw
serves as metaphor for the ontic necessity of the philosophical decision. In its ontic
mode, the affirmation marks the temporal completion of a circle which is comprised
of the aleatory point and the multiplicity of possible outcomes.
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2.3 The ‘I’ of the Corporeal
Historical views from theology and philosophy posit an ontologically necessary I
where only a contingent this persists. The cogito is a non-essential atemporal
abstraction that stands for the mark of unity between ontic experience and its
supposed ontological genesis. Phenomenally, the I encounters a range of differential
empirical stimulus, providing a seemingly necessary, yet always relative mode of
understanding attuned to the ontic world, itself divided into two human-centric
essential properties: time and space. Corporeality stratifies existence into an
existential doubling: overlapping and relational empirical ‘events’, ‘materially’-derived
ontic necessities which persist relative to time and space, and the ontological
suppositions endemic to empirical understanding of the ‘event’ as such, allegorized as
the cogito. Despite the formation of a field of grounding ontic modalities, the body
does not constitute a philosophical substance which captures a world of totality. As
Gabriel argues: “If the self was a substance, our cognitive access to it would have to be
the grasp of substance. Yet, our cognitive access to any substance is fallible insofar as
it has to represent the substance in question.”87 The representation of the self as
derived from the ontic modalities of the body relies on a logical synthesis of variable
properties that provide an aesthetic veneer of corporeal totality. We neither observe a
fractured I reaching out in to a cohesive total world, nor do we experience a fixed,
determinate subject ‘thrown’ in to a chaotic world. Both conceptions are
fundamentally based on mythological structures of thought of another variety: the
supposition of substance with respect to the subject assumes an existent, yet
unobservable ontological given where only ontic difference persists. Likewise, positing
the world as a necessary totality confuses the essence of causation with the contingent
nature of effect. As Deleuze notes: “For Kant as for Descartes, it is the identity of the
Self in the ‘I think’ which grounds the harmony of all the faculties and their agreement
on the form of a supposed same object.”88 The body has, in our era, become the stand-
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in for an elusive I—the ground which stretches along time as a supposed self-Same
object within which the world becomes known. Corporeality produces sense, but that
sense remains ideal. The body is the quasi-cause of incorporeal schemes that govern
the subjective relation to the body as an object of representation. In the cataloguing of
the various modalities of the body, the subject adopts various “best practices” (doxa)
that reinforce the view of the body as an essential object to which positive affirmations
may be applied.
In its specific mode of understanding, the corporeal I is the producer of sense with
respect to its reference, understood traditionally as the world as it exists in itself. In an
onto-theological framework, the I finds its strongest dualism: the world of the
corporeal—of phenomena derived from sensuous encounters,’ and that of the
spiritual or mystic—speculative flows of meaning operating independently of the
confines of time and space. The concept of the infinite is the concept of an ontotheological supposition of an I immemorial, preceding and proceeding the corporeal
life of time and space. The aleatory circle demonstrates the nature of the corporeal
encounter: strictly contingent, persistently bound by the confines of time and space,
and mediated by a decision-mechanism of unknown origin. The reference of sense is
always that which forces the philosophical decision: the multiple and the different. It
seems apparent that the world, whether conceived as material, real, virtual, etc. marks
the grounding point for empirical sensation and, as such, adopts the character of that
which grounds corporeal existence: namely, the body.
The enclosure of the aleatory circle demonstrates the rigid structure of corporeal
ontic experience. The emergence of the event marks the beginning point of an ontic
encounter that has its ground in sensuous contact with an object of some definition.
We have provisionally defined the event as the moment of expressive encounter
within which the subject discovers the real or material world as the base that
constitutes the mythological apparatus—always relative to the contingency of the
subject in time and space, and as a quasi-determinate temporal object containing both
the aleatory moment in its multiplicity and the closure engendered by the
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philosophical or moral decision. But what dynamics describe the event? What are its
possible points of contact with the ‘world’ as we have provisionally defined it? What
characterizes the event relative to a grounded determination of positive value?
We have noted that the mythological apparatus contains a serialized form of
repetitive ontic philosophical or moral decisions, but to this point have neglected the
question of the genesis of the event in itself. We have tied the notion of the event to
time and space and to the body and corporeality, but should we consider the body as a
determinate, necessary ontic entity? Deleuze poses the question in the following
manner:
…all bodies are causes in relation to each other, and causes for each
other—but causes of what? They are causes of certain things of an
entirely different nature. These effects are not bodies, but, properly
speaking, “incorporeal” entities. They are not physical qualities and
properties, but rather logical or dialectical attributes. They are not
things or facts, but events. We can not say that they exist, but rather
that they subsist or inhere (having the minimum of being which is
appropriate to that which is not a thing, a nonexisting entity). They are
not substantives or adjectives but verbs.89
Deleuze separates the cause (depth) with the effect (surface), and positions events
within the process of becoming. As such, Deleuze frees the event from a total
determination based in the corporeal view. Deleuze continues:
Incorporeal effects are never themselves causes in relation to each
other; rather, they are only “quasi-causes” following laws which
perhaps express in each case the relative unity or mixture of bodies on
which they depends for their real causes. Thus freedom is preserved in
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two complimentary manners: once in the interiority of destiny as a
connection between causes, and once more in the exteriority of events
as a bond of effects.90
The event is comprised of a point of sensuous contact wherein the subject encounters
an indeterminate entity situated in time and space. What provides relevance to the
subject is an opening of the multiplicity of ontic variation which demands the subject
to consider a decision in a moral or philosophical manner. The mythological
apparatus informs the subjective interpretation of an event in two ways: 1) by relating
the multiplicity of possibility to the precedence of past experience, and 2) by
informing the subject as to the relevance of the components which comprise the
aleatory moment. In the case of the dice throw, the basis for the totality of the aleatory
is contained within a set of given parameters. The number of sides and corresponding
numerals determine a complete framework of possibility. As such, the mythological
apparatus is constituted on the basis of pre-set rules that relate the aleatory moment to
empirical precedent. If, for example, a subject had never encountered a die before, and
threw five consecutive one throws, we could suppose that the subject would determine
that the ones were caused each time as an ontic necessity contained within the
‘essence’ of the throw, not as random chance or a chaotic closure of the possibility for
variation. We ‘learn’ that the possibility contained in each throw is unique only by
reconfiguring the mythological apparatus to accept the multiple pursuant to the
aleatory moment. The dice throw relies on a point of sensuous contact informing the
subject as to the possibilities contained within the rules of the game, but only via
repetition and difference. In simple games, the totality of possibility finds correlation
in the myth apparatus as a simple abstraction. We understand, even if we see just a
few throws of the dice, and based on the relation of the dice, the rules of the throw,
and the world of time and space which govern its modalities, that the dice throw
contains a finite multiplicity of basic proportions. However, as complexity increases,

90

Ibid., 6.

60
difference has the tendency to overwhelm the subject, forcing the myth apparatus into
a truncated view of the multiple, amending the myth apparatus into using a series of
short-hands or shortcuts. It is clear that the rules of the game governing ontic
existence are significantly more complex than a simple throw of the dice. The myth
apparatus appears as necessary in order to ‘make sense’ of the world in its complexity.
The fractured subject cannot contain the multiplicities of ontic possibility within
which increasing complexity works to undermine the structures of understanding.
The mythological apparatus represents a defensive matrix—a field of interpretation
that simultaneously brings ‘understanding’ to the world while also providing a veneer
of personal cohesion. The self persists as the constitutive and constituted mythological
apparatus—a serialized, linear, open and closed mode of adopting and rejecting
variability based on the conjugation of precedence and the value judgments inherent
to the moral or philosophical decision.
We have described the philosophical or moral decision as the ‘completion’ or
enclosure of the multiplicity contained in the aleatory moment. However, the
‘outcome’ of an event should not be considered as an absolutely free decision
undertaken by the subject. As a rule, the framework established by the ‘game’
designates a particular type of determinacy. The rules of the game establish a ground
from which the philosophical or moral decision proceeds. These are quasideterminate, incorporeal moments of affirmation. In this way, the subject
simultaneously creates doxa or good sense based on a quasi-determinate outcome,
while simultaneously reaffirming the set of ontic rules that constitutes the game in the
first instance. As such, we observe an ontic doubling which includes the serialization
of ontic processes along with the re-affirmation of the ontic preconditions
establishing this dynamic at its very beginning. The origin of the rules of the game
relies on a designation of the multiple as one of necessity. This necessity, however, in
its elimination of variables outside its domain, reveals itself as ontic contingency. A
subject that has never encountered a dice game, for example, would lack any
conceptual fore-knowledge of the rules governing the multiplicity of outcomes. The
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subject relies on experience in order to discover a constructed framework within
which ‘necessity’ is expressed.
We return here to the failure of the self-same object to ground the multiplicity of
possible events. This dynamic is punctuated by an essential lack: it is only through
discovery of the differences expressed by finite sets of rules that the subject informs
their conceptual framework, constituting an imaginative understanding of possibility
that supposes complete determinacy where only quasi-determinacy persists. On the
concept of structure, Deleuze notes: “It is thus pleasing that there resounds today the
news that sense is never a principle or an origin, but that it is produced. It is not
something to discover, to restore, and to re-employ; it is something to produce by new
machinery.”91
Whatever the world is, as a real or virtual totality or framework, it seems to present
phenomenally to the ‘subject’. That which forces us to think also forces us to the
philosophical decision. This mode, however, does not in itself present the world as a
complex, yet knowable totality. If anything, the contingent nature of the encounter
with respect to corporeality demonstrates the chaotic nature underwriting pure ontic
possibility. Exposed as a series of aleatory possibilities, the empirical event situates the
corporeal subject within its necessary ontic modes: time and space. The concept of the
encounter is intimately tied with that of expression. That which forces us to think
denotes a set of determinations that are supposed to exist independently of the
subjective view. As Deleuze characterizes it:
On the one hand, events-effects maintain a relation of causality with
their physical causes, without this relation being one of necessity; it is
rather a relation of expression. On the other hand, they have between
them, or with their ideational quasi-cause, no longer a relation of
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causality, but rather, once again and this time exclusively, a relation of
expression.92
Despite the expansions and contractions of the relative nature of time and
autonomous ‘experiences’ of space, likely at least two ontic universals persist with
respect to human existence: The first is the linear nature of the experience of time.
Despite debates regarding memory, repetition, anamnesis, the eternal return, etc., it
seems likely that the concept of linear time is a necessary supposition with respect to
corporeal inquiry. The second ontic universal is the consciousness of space and time
as they conjugate into empirical events, thus forming the basis for the aleatory
moment and its moral completion. As noted above, the enclosure of the aleatory circle
is an ontic necessity. The gambler, for instance, cannot not throw the dice, lest he or
she walk away from the game in its entirety. It is here, perhaps, we encounter
Heidegger’s looking away formulation. It is only in the dynamic looking away (from
the ontic) that the ‘subject’ glimpses the ‘world’ (the game) in its entirety. As Deleuze
characterizes it: “The philosopher takes the side of the idiot as though of a man
without presuppositions”.93 Could we read the refusal to confront the aleatory
moment as an abject rejection of the ontic game? Perhaps the gambler is the comedian
of the ontic parlay, whereas the recluse encounters an element of the sublime?
Recalling that Kant defined the sublime as that sensation which overcomes the subject
on realization of the unbridgeable gap between the subject and nature, might the
recluse mark a mode of subjective resistance to this dynamic in its entirety? The
ascetic mode may be one of non-attunement to the ontic world.
The mythological apparatus is grounded in the enclosure of ontic serializations. It
is both constituting and constitutive, responding to the ‘world’ and forming the basis
of the ‘subject.’ The subject should not be understood as substance—as a cohesive
totality in itself, reaching out in to a chaotic world. The complex totality of the subject
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is none other than the synthetic cohesion of the mythological apparatus in its ontic
mode. The world designates the situating of the fractured subject within a set of ontic
circumstances governed by time and space, yet always open to the conditions of the
possible found within the multiplicity of the aleatory moment. The ontological,
alternatively foreclosed on as unobservable, unmeasurable, unquantifiable, etc.,
designates the possibility of the infinite, of authentic unity, or of the completion of the
fractured I with respect to Being. As Nancy remarks: “What is born has no form, nor it
is the fundament that is born. “To be born is rather to transform, transport, and
entrance all determinations.”94
We observe two dynamics with respect to Being: 1) God, as the allegorical concept
of completed Being, stands for a synthetic unity of ontic concepts—ideations which
persist outside the ontic necessities of time and space, and 2) God as the ontological
concept of all possibility—of completed Being which persists in its indeterminacy
ahead of the multiplicity of the aleatory moment as well as the philosophical or moral
decisions whose repetitions form the mythological apparatus. In the former
conception, God operates in a determinate mode—giving rise to modalities of the
event and the providing a basis for the value judgments inherent to the philosophical
or moral decision. In the latter conception, God adopts the quality of the
indeterminate, of the chaosmos or of the non-ground.95
We may not be able to chart the flows of ontic experience back to primordial Being
and the world itself, but we can mark the conditions of possibility that allow the
human subject to glimpse the ontological all possible. It is only through the complex
interactions formed within the ontic world, and the subject persisting within its
governing structures, that allow for a concept of total unity to emerge. If there is any
substance to Lévi-Strauss’ claim—that originary myths persist across culture and thus
demonstrate a structural (ontic necessity)—perhaps the allegory of the fall of man
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points to an original lack, or negative, which births the concept of God and of a world
of complete Being over and above what appears to be the case: the world is a
construction drawn together from a field of chaos, a unity of corporeal experience
with a repetitive, constituted and constitutive mythological apparatus expressing
meaning as a reflection of the moral and philosophical affirmations of the subject.

Conclusion: The Myth of the Eternal Return
We have focused primarily on the concept of ‘world’—its possible form, exigencies,
and the implications for a new philosophy of mythology. Chapter One introduced the
concept of world critical to an understanding of the metaphysical and cultural
apparatuses informing the modern era. Chapter Two separated the concept of world
into two distinct conceptualizations: that of a totalized, necessary whole, and that of a
chaotic series punctuated only by events, situating the mythological apparatus within
the dynamic of the aleatory circle.
Rather than conclude with an approach to the concept of mythology from the dual
perspectives of whole/chaos, we will instead accept the world as ‘given’—as an
ontically necessary object within which subjective meaning persists. Following
Deleuze, we characterized the event as an incorporeal ‘quasi-caused’ phenomena,
grounded in forces the subject encounters in a chaotic world. As such, the event
describes a phantasm: “It describes as such to an ideational surface over which it is
produced as an effect. It transcends inside and outside since its topological property is
to bring “its” internal and external sides into contact, in order for them to unfold onto
a single side.”96 The event is characterized by a point of phenomenal contact with an
ontic multiplicity that we have referred to as the aleatory point or the opening of the
ontic multiple. The event also contains the necessary ontic foreclosure of the aleatory
or multiple point of contact through what we have referred to as the moral or
philosophical decision—a closing of the multiple in favor of the singular. We
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positioned the mythological apparatus as an ontic framework or ruleset that is
constituted as a series of historical ‘outcomes’ of the foreclosure of the aleatory circle,
but also as a constituting frame preceding the subject in the guise of the return of the
same. We have described, in a preliminary way, the genesis of the event as an ontic
given—a series of chaotic, yet existent, points of contact where time, space, and the
body (corporeality) meet at the subject position. Despite the incorporeal character of
the event, we observe that the world, whatever its conception, must act as the basis or
(quasi) cause of the event as such. In the absence of world, no ontic understanding is
possible, and no ontological inquiry may proceed. In Chapter Two we described the
mythological apparatus as an ontic frame that serves to capture repetition (as doxa, or
good sense) as a series of “best practices” that exclude the ontic multiple.
The question for a new philosophy of mythology is to interrogate the conditions of
the event in its relation to the master concept of Being. We can provisionally define
Being as the essence of meaning—a self-same real-existing ontological object. Objects
that persist in the world lack Being as an essential characteristic—they are simulacra
that, according to Deleuze are “those systems in which different relates to different by
means of difference itself.”97 Two philosophical errors describe the essence of Being: 1)
as the ground that provides meaning to real-existing objects within the world, and 2)
as the necessary whole of the world from which the contingency of particulars
emanates. On our view, Being can only describe meaning in its most fundamental
form: as the unity of a necessary self-same property that ‘completes’ the fracture of the
world. We have derivatives of meaning describing ontic objects, but not Being. We
also have a type of meaning derived from sense, which represents the play of the
surface: language games or formal logic. Meaning, in its grandest conception, must be
understood as a fundamental, existential or phenomenal thing whose essence is selfexpressive and infinite, immobile and immemorial. Philosophy errs when it looks for
Being in physical properties of material or ‘real’ objects. Likewise, when philosophy
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seeks the essence of the forces (causes) that underwrite the phenomena (effects)
(alternatively ‘depth’/’surface’) it misses the fundamental character of meaning and of
Being itself.
We have described the glimpse into the ontological all possible as a primary
characteristic of the aleatory circle, but a description of the conditions for the
ontological all possible is not adequate to a description of Being as such. The glimpse
of the ontological all possible expressed in the structure of the aleatory circle is only
an opening that operates negatively on the ontic multiple. This negative is not a
determinate negation—it does not contain a logical affirmation from which ontic
particulars flow. Likewise, this negative is not a cognitive process proceeding to a
complete, ideal product. Instead, the negative of the ontological all possible is chaos.
Chaos gives definition to the false unity of the essence of the same. It is the destruction
of the eternal return of the same and of meaningful repetition. Chaos is the ontological
all possible without depth. It is the background to the ‘noise’ of the surface and to
representation. The aleatory circle, persisting in the event, catches sight of the all
possible as an opening—as the destruction of the rules which govern the ontic game.
The glimpse of the ontological all possible is both a blessing and a tyranny. In its
absence, the subject falls into the ontic world—a world of paradox, of positive
affirmation grounded only in a belief in the necessity of time, space, and the body. In
glimpsing the ontological all possible, the subject comes to understand the limitless
nature of existence brought finite in its corporeal mode. In this sense, the ontological
acts as an ironic negative from which various philosophical or moral positions
emerge: nihilism, cynicism, and stoicism. Likewise, the ontological all possible affords
theological thought its founding doxa. Unity of the subject against ontological chaos
allegorizes the primal will of the creator. The proper name of God stands for that
which cannot exist in the ontic game: infinite unity. This logic relies on chaos as a
determinate negation of that which is supposed to persist. Against all empirical
observation, the unity of the subject is taken as a necessary ontological object from
which emanates the fundamental meaning of Being as such.
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The subject relies on repetition in grounding the theological apparatus. Here,
mythology adopts a doxa of another type. In Deleuze’s work on time he describes
Aion as “the past-future, which in an infinite subdivision of the abstract moment
endlessly decomposes itself in both directions at once and forever sidesteps the
present.”98 He describes Chronos as “the present which alone exists.”99 Repetition
persists only with the present, within Chronos. Aion is the break—the fracture that
disrupts the present and forces linear repetition. It appears that the nature of the
subject is binary, existing in two places at once. The present moment is a conjugation
of past, present, and future—an incomplete whole grounded only in meaningful
repetition. A critique of the metaphysics of presence amounts to a dissolution of the
unity of the subject as a coherent totality with respect to the conjugation of time and
space. There is no expression of subject other than as the fractured meeting point of
time, space, and body. Aion is simultaneously the creator and the destroyer—the
moment of conflict that disrupts the ideal unity of the subject while also creating the
groundless firmament on which the subject stands. Deleuze notes:
It is the decentered center which traces between the series, and for all
disjunctions, the merciless straight line of the Aion, that is, the distance
whereupon the castoffs of the self, the world, and God are lined up: the
Grand Canyon of the world, the “crack” of the self, and the
dismembering of God.100
That which calls the subject to Being is already the creation of its impossibility. As
with the aleatory circle, Aion forces the enclosure of repetition back into the tyranny
of the present.
A subject who speaks of ‘being present’ refers to close proximity with a
mythological apparatus rich in repetition. This apparatus has its ground in the
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conjugation of ontic ‘rulings’ with representation and reflection. Representation is the
image of thought that proceeds from sensuous contact—a mediating mechanism that
offers short-hand understandings of ontic modalities. The positive affirmation of
sensuous experience adopts the form of metonymy, metaphor, or allegory, prompting
a synthetic deduction ascertained in the moment of reflection. Deleuze writes, “A
representation on its own is not enough to form knowledge. In order to know
something, we need not only to have a representation, but to be able to go beyond
it…”101 This beyond is the point of synthesis which binds together representation with
reflection. What lacks in the proper name finds apotheosis in the conjugation of
partial objects. In this sense, a positive thing becomes an object of representation
through its encounter with that which it is not. The subject of representation mixes
the flux of difference with historical precedent in order to make sense of the world in a
concrete manner. Incommensurate Ideas grounded in representation are endemic to a
formal system of thought that lacks a determinate grounding mechanism. As such, the
mythological apparatus that ‘represents’ the rules of the ontic game tends to abort
incoherent Ideas in favor of a serialized heterogeneous framework within which
“correct” representations are contained. Reason tends to intervene on behalf of value
judgments in order to rationalize the myth apparatus. Hence, doxa or good sense is
always laden with a moral imposition of indeterminate grounding. Vacillations within
ontic representation are given secondary status to a set of master predicates, from
which the frame of the world takes shape. Here we observe the return of the picture of
the world as an ontological whole, one expressing its necessities in a coherent manner.
In this scheme, the subject need only fine-tune its mythological frame in adaptation to
the ‘world’ of repetitive ontic events.
The reduction of ontic multiplicity to serialized repetitions affords the subject a
brand of cultural primacy over the ‘world.’ What presents as mastery is nothing more
than false unity—a means by which the subject eliminates ‘non-sense’ or ‘irrelevant

101

Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London:
The Athlone Press, 1984), 4.

69
details’ from the mythological apparatus. Paradoxical or ‘nonsensical’ phenomena
which fail to cohere with the unity provided by the mythological apparatus are given
secondary ontic status—leftovers of an ever-greater teleological endeavor.
Invariably described as illusions or fantasies, ‘mythological’ thinking is defined
through its relation to a pre-supposed, objective reality. As outlined in Chapter Two,
the adherence to a supposition of a totalized, necessary and knowable world has
positioned mythological thought outside the realm of meaningful understanding.
Likewise, in a concept of the world as fractured and chaotic, mythologies become
ideational repetitions, grounded in the ‘best practices’ of corporeality. There is a third
form of myth that bears very little relation to the world as such, insofar as we
understand world as the background within which subjective meaning persists. This
variety of myth is deeply personal, mystic, or borne of the other. It is, in our
conception, the eternal return that lacks an essential grounding property in the selfSame or original. Philosophy and the natural sciences generally circle the question of
ground as the starting point for the construction of a framework of analysis. In the
existentialist and phenomenological traditions of philosophy, however, what is given
in thought as a relation to phenomena is elevated to a higher status. As Merleau-Ponty
notes on the illusions of subjectivity:
…he must appeal beyond them to himself who is their titular and
therefore must know what motivates them from within; he must lose
them as a state of fact in order to reconstruct them as his own
possibilities, in order to learn from himself what they mean in truth,
what delivers him over to both perception and to phantasms—in a
word, he must reflect.102
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Classically conceived, reflection brings together the expressed with the representation
as a synthesis that comprises the subject. It is supposed that the Same returns, as a
knowable ground whose properties are brought into synthesis by way of the faculties
of cognition. But what is reflected is a mirror of repetition. If the world is a given, then
it follows that what is ontically ‘necessary’ finds its proper place within the subject. In
this sense, the expressive quality of the world finds its correlate through a proper
methodology. Repetition is the pattern of that which persists in time. It is corporeally
bound, subject to the conditions of space and physiological ‘necessity.’ It is the not the
eternal return of the Same but the ideal synthesis of ontic contingency playing out
through the conditions of time and space. The myth of the eternal return is the myth
of the repetition of phenomena in their idealized, unconditioned form. It is supposed
that the eternal return illuminates the forces that underwrite phenomenal repetition,
but as Deleuze notes of mechanism:
Why is mechanism such a bad interpretation of the eternal return?
Because it does not necessarily or directly imply the eternal return.
Because it only entails the false consequence of a final state. This final
state is held to be identical to the initial state and, to this extent, it is
concluded that the mechanical process passes through the same set of
differences again.103
It is the ontic multiple with births the mythological apparatus through the necessary
foreclosure of the conditions of possibility contained in multiplicity. The eternal
return represents another ruling—a mythical repetition within which ontic difference
is subordinated to the logic of the Same, the logic of the world as a necessary totality
expressing its existent properties. The eternal return is sense of another type, bringing
unity to the non-sense that precedes ontic multiplicity. What returns eternally, in our
view, is the ontological all possible, illuminated by the destruction of the ontic
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multiple and by the expression of time, space, and corporeality as ontically contingent
phenomena grounded solely in subjective sense.
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